Internal and External Constraints of the African Union’s Mediation in the Malian Crisis : Perspectives for a Strengthened Role in Conflict Management in Africa for a Sustainable Compromise
Abstract
This article analyses the internal and external constraints that have hindered the effectiveness of the African Union's (AU) mediation in the Malian crisis since 2012. Despite its efforts, the AU has faced institutional limitations, a lack of coordination with regional organisations, and interference from external actors, diminishing its role in achieving a lasting compromise. The study adopts a qualitative approach, combining interviews with AU officials and Malian stakeholders, along with a review of institutional reports and academic publications. It highlights several limiting factors: a lack of resources, poor coordination with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), strategic divergences among member states, and dependence on external funding, particularly from the European Union and the United States. Furthermore, the involvement of international actors such as France, the United Nations (UN), and Russia has reduced the AU’s autonomy and its ability to implement lasting solutions. The article proposes several recommendations to strengthen the AU’s role in the management of conflicts across Africa. In particular, it suggests greater financial autonomy, enhanced cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the training of specialised mediators through a Pan-African Peace and Security Academy, as well as a redefinition of relations with external powers to enhance the organisation’s legitimacy. These reforms aim to enable the AU to better fulfil its mandate of promoting peace, security, and stability across the continent.
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Firozpur Jhirka, Haryana, India
