



THE IMPACT OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS ON FOREIGN POLICY: A LEGAL AND DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK

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Abstract

The impact of parliamentary oversight mechanisms on foreign policy decision-making processes is of critical importance for democratic governance and the rule of law. This research examines how parliamentary oversight tools shape the transparency, accountability, and democratic legitimacy of foreign policy within a multidimensional framework. The fundamental research question investigates the ways and extent to which parliamentary oversight mechanisms affect the content, direction, and democratic legitimacy of foreign policy. The research hypothesis posits that countries with strong parliamentary oversight mechanisms produce foreign policy decisions that are more transparent, more accountable, and more reflective of societal interests. The study employs a mixed-methods approach, incorporating panel data analysis covering twenty-eight countries, three in-depth case studies, and qualitative content analysis of parliamentary records. The theoretical framework is grounded in principal-agent theory, veto players theory, democratic peace theory, and liberal institutionalism. Findings demonstrate a strong positive relationship between parliamentary oversight capacity and foreign policy transparency. As the specialization level of foreign relations committees increases, the arbitrary action space of the executive narrows; as budget oversight intensifies, foreign policy-related costs decrease; and as parliamentary questions and investigations proliferate, executive discourse becomes more cautious and aligned with international law. Research results reveal that parliamentary oversight constitutes not merely a domestic political requirement but also a strategic advantage in terms of international credibility and cooperation. The study proposes recommendations for strengthening the institutional capacities of parliaments, developing expert support systems, and effectively utilizing digital technologies in oversight processes. The future of democratic governance



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depends on activating parliamentary oversight in all decision-making processes, including the foreign policy domain.

Keywords:

Parliamentary Oversight, Foreign Policy, Democratic Governance, Accountability, Institutional Design.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In contemporary democratic systems, parliament assumes not only the legislative function but also the responsibility of constraining the executive and ensuring its accountability through the exercise of oversight authority (Griglio, 2020; Beetham, 2006). This function is of critical importance particularly in the domain of foreign policy, as foreign policy decisions both determine the international dimension of national sovereignty and constitute an arena in which democratic legitimacy is tested (Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Born & Hänggi, 2004). Although foreign policy has traditionally been perceived as the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch, parliamentary oversight mechanisms in this domain constitute an indispensable element in the operationalization of the democratic principle of checks and balances (Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Cole et al., 2015).

This study examines the impact of parliamentary oversight mechanisms on foreign policy decision-making processes within a legal and democratic framework. Parliamentary instruments such as legislative authority, budgetary approval, ratification of international agreements, votes of no confidence, parliamentary inquiries, written and oral question mechanisms, and supreme audit institution oversight function as institutional structures that strengthen the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy (Born & Fluri, 2003; Griglio, 2020). The effectiveness of these mechanisms constitutes one of the concrete indicators of democratic governance quality and the rule of law (Stapenhurst et al., 2008; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2017).

Parliamentary oversight authority over foreign policy represents not merely a procedural requirement but rather the extension of the principles of representation, participation, and accountability—which constitute the essence of democratic regimes—into the foreign policy domain (Papadopoulos, 2023; O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). This parliamentary role ensures the balance of authority particularly in the foreign policy domain where the executive possesses broad discretionary powers. Consequently, parliamentary oversight serves the institutionalization of democratic power through the constraint of executive authority (Tsebelis, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

When the foreign policy domain is evaluated within the conceptual framework of high politics, it is regarded as an area closed to parliamentary intervention (Dunne et al., 2021; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). However, modern democratic theory and comparative politics research demonstrate that parliaments have increasingly become more effective actors in foreign policy (Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Heffler et al., 2015). Liberal

institutionalism contends that the role of parliaments in foreign policy enhances democratic legitimacy and policy consistency (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Keohane & Nye, 2001). Democratic peace theory, in turn, advances the proposition that regimes with strong parliamentary oversight behave more peacefully and predictably in foreign policy (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997).

Parliamentary oversight of foreign policy can be conceptually explained within the framework of principal-agent theory (Tsebelis, 2002). In this approach, the people constitute the principal, parliament represents the first-level agent, and the executive serves as the second-level agent. Parliamentary oversight mechanisms function as institutional instruments that prevent executive overreach in foreign policy and ensure accountability (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Peters, Wagner, & Deitelhoff, 2010). This theoretical framework provides a robust conceptual foundation for understanding why and how parliament influences foreign policy.

Parliamentary legislative authority constitutes the legal foundation of foreign policy. The incorporation of international agreements into domestic law is accomplished through the parliamentary ratification process, and this process ensures the legal legitimacy of foreign policy decisions (Franck, 1990; Byers, 2000). Constitutional arrangements, international law norms, and democratic representation principles constitute the three fundamental bases that shape this parliamentary authority (Krasner, 1999). Agreements ratified by parliaments determine the country's international obligations while simultaneously playing a decisive role in the preservation of national sovereignty (Klabbers, 2021; Slaughter, 2004).

Parliamentary authority to formulate and scrutinize the budget constitutes a critical instrument that determines the implementability of foreign policy. Defense expenditures, financing of diplomatic missions, contributions to international organizations, and foreign aid budgets require parliamentary approval (Stapenhurst et al., 2008). This fiscal oversight renders parliament an indirect yet effective actor in the determination of foreign policy priorities (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008). Parliamentary authority over the budget constitutes a structural power element that shapes the executive's foreign policy preferences.

Votes of no confidence, parliamentary inquiries, general debates, and written and oral question mechanisms represent the principal instruments through which parliament brings foreign policy onto its agenda and exercises oversight over the executive (Beetham, 2006; Griglio, 2020). These mechanisms fulfill both information-gathering and political accountability functions, thereby ensuring the transparency of foreign policy (Born & Fluri, 2003). Particularly during periods of crisis, the frequency of parliamentary utilization of these instruments increases, and influence over executive foreign policy decisions intensifies (Wagner, 2018). Parliamentary questioning constitutes an institutional channel that reflects public sensitivity in the determination of the foreign policy agenda (Lindsay, 1994; Kegley & Wittkopf, 2006).

Supreme audit institution oversight constitutes a technical mechanism through which parliament ensures fiscal accountability in the foreign policy domain. Expenditures of diplomatic representations, utilization of resources allocated to international projects, and oversight of the defense budget are conducted through the supreme audit institution. Supreme audit institution reports represent one of the fundamental evidentiary sources in parliament's holding of the executive accountable and provide objective data for evaluating the effectiveness of foreign policy implementations (Stapenhurst et al., 2008).

The most fundamental problem affecting parliamentary oversight authority in the foreign policy domain is information asymmetry (Born & Hänggi, 2004). Strengthening parliamentary rights to information is necessary in order to break the executive branch's

monopoly on information regarding diplomatic processes. Without information parity, parliamentary oversight remains at a formal level and loses its effectiveness (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). For this reason, the establishment of mechanisms enabling parliaments to regularly request information from governments and to gain controlled access to classified documents is of critical importance (Griglio, 2020).

Parliamentary diplomacy constitutes a new dimension through which parliaments directly influence foreign policy. Inter-parliamentary unions, international parliamentary conferences, and bilateral parliamentary delegations create diplomatic channels that develop outside the executive (Inter-Parliamentary Union & Venice Commission, 2008). These channels enable foreign policy to transform into a multi-actor process and increase parliamentary visibility in the international arena. Parliamentary diplomacy serves a function that strengthens soft power capacity and accelerates the transposition of international norms into domestic law (Nye, 2004).

The preponderance in the literature of studies that generally examine foreign policy from an executive-centered perspective necessitates greater scholarly attention to the role of parliaments in foreign policy. Raunio and Wagner (2018) have demonstrated that parliamentary foreign policy authorities have notably increased in the European Union context following the Lisbon Treaty. Kaarbo (2012) has established that parliamentary capacity to veto foreign policy decisions in coalition governments enhances foreign policy consistency. Lindsay (1994) has argued that the United States Congress's attempts to constrain the executive in foreign policy generate predictability in international relations. These studies empirically confirm that parliaments are not passive but rather active and determinative actors in foreign policy (Peters & Wagner, 2011; Wagner, 2018).

In the contemporary era of intensifying debates concerning democratic backsliding, the balancing role played by parliamentary oversight mechanisms in foreign policy has gained even greater importance (Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999). In governmental systems where the executive has been strengthened, parliamentary oversight constitutes a critical instrument for the preservation of democratic quality (Ladwig, 2025; Levitsky & Way, 2002: 51-64; O'Donnell et al., 2004).

In countries where populism has ascended, a restriction of parliamentary roles in foreign policy is observed. Populist executives exhibit a tendency to personalize foreign policy through the discourse of direct popular mandate, thereby weakening parliamentary oversight (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). This situation leads to foreign policy's departure from the institutional framework and its arbitrariness. In systems where parliamentary oversight is strong, foreign policy decisions are more consistent, more predictable, and more aligned with international norms (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Zürn, 2018).

The fundamental research question of this study is as follows: *To what extent and through what pathways do parliamentary oversight mechanisms influence foreign policy decision-making processes?* To address this research question, the study evaluates not only parliament's legal authorities but also actual oversight practices, institutional capacity levels, and political context in conjunction. The research hypothesis is as follows: *The stronger the alignment between the constitutional and legal definition of parliamentary oversight authorities and the actual exercise of these authorities, the higher the democratic legitimacy, legal consistency, and societal acceptance of foreign policy decisions* (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Peters et al., 2010).

This study is positioned at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations disciplines and adopts an interdisciplinary approach (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2019). In

analyzing parliament's influence on foreign policy, institutional design theories (Tsebelis, 2002), democratic governance models (Beetham, 2006; Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005), principal-agent theory (Born & Hänggi, 2004), and foreign policy analysis approaches (Hudson, 2014; Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2021) are employed in conjunction. This multiple theoretical framework is necessary to comprehend the complexity of the subject and evaluate it from different perspectives.

The significance of this research can be addressed on three levels: On the theoretical level, it clarifies the institutional and behavioral mechanisms that explain parliament's role in foreign policy (Keohane, 1989; Moravcsik, 1998). On the empirical level, it renders measurable the impact of parliamentary oversight on foreign policy outputs through comparative data (Peters & Wagner, 2011; Wagner, 2018). On the policy level, it contributes to the improvement of democratic governance by offering concrete recommendations for strengthening parliamentary oversight (Beetham, 2006; Griglio, 2020).

The scope of the study encompasses parliamentary instruments including legislation, budgetary oversight, political accountability mechanisms, information rights, and international parliamentary interaction tools. Foreign policy is addressed through its principal domains including international agreements, defense policies, diplomatic missions, participation in international organizations, and foreign aid. The study focuses on democratic regimes but also incorporates comparative analyses with hybrid regimes.

The anticipated contributions of this research are as follows: First, to strengthen the conceptual framework explaining parliament's role in foreign policy and to fill the theoretical gap in the literature; second, to demonstrate the impact of parliamentary oversight mechanisms on foreign policy through empirical evidence; third, to offer policy recommendations for enhancing parliamentary foreign policy oversight capacity for the improvement of democratic governance. These contributions will constitute a concrete foundation for both academic debates and institutional reforms.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature concerning the impact of parliamentary oversight mechanisms on foreign policy is defined as an increasingly expanding field of research within the disciplines of political science, international relations, and constitutional law. Particularly in democratic regimes, the role of parliaments in shaping foreign policy has been evaluated as an institutional check and balance function against the absolute dominance of the executive. At the theoretical level, this field has been shaped by the tension between the traditional realist approach that views foreign policy as the monopoly of the executive and the liberal institutionalist approach that emphasizes the determinative role of parliamentary institutions (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1984, 1989). This tension has profoundly influenced the epistemological and methodological foundations of the discipline, leading to the proliferation of comparative research aimed at empirically measuring the role of parliaments in foreign policy. Beetham (2006) systematically examined the critical functions of parliaments in terms of democracy and governance in the twenty-first century and emphasized that foreign policy oversight constitutes one of the indicators of democratic quality.

The manner in which new institutionalist literature explains the impact of parliaments on foreign policy processes is organized around the concepts of institutional design and veto players. Tsebelis's (2002) veto players theory explains how parliaments transform into significant actors capable of decelerating, modifying, or directing foreign policy decisions.

This theoretical framework has demonstrated that parliaments are not merely formal approval bodies but rather strategic actors that structurally shape policy outputs. The multiplicity of veto points increases the stability of foreign policy decisions while reducing their flexibility; this balance varies according to regime type, coalition structure, and the institutional capacity of parliament (Tsebelis, 2002; Kaarbo, 2012). Lake and Powell (1999), while explaining how domestic institutional structures shape foreign policy behaviors within the framework of the strategic choice approach, demonstrated that parliamentary veto power enhances state credibility in international negotiations.

Müller and Saalfeld (1997), by examining the roles and behaviors of parliamentarians in Western Europe, revealed the increasing specialization tendency of parliamentarians on foreign policy matters. Longley and Davidson (1998), while discussing the new roles of parliamentary committees, emphasized the function of foreign relations committees in reducing information asymmetry. Particularly in countries with strong parliamentary traditions such as Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, the level of specialization in committee systems determines the quality of influence over foreign policy (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). In these countries, parliamentary ex ante oversight authority provides not only an approval mechanism but also the opportunity for direct intervention in the policy formation process. In contrast, in semi-presidential systems, parliamentary oversight remains weaker, and executive discretionary authority expands (Peters, Wagner, & Deitelhoff, 2010). Norton (1990, 1998), while comparatively examining Western European parliaments, explained the relationship between parliamentary power and governmental stability, demonstrating that strong parliaments ensure more consistent decision-making in foreign policy.

The concept of democratic accountability constitutes a central concept that unites the role of parliaments in foreign policy at both normative and empirical levels. Russett (1993) and Doyle (1997), within the framework of democratic peace theory, empirically demonstrated that regimes with strong parliamentary oversight behave more peacefully in foreign policy. This finding indicates that parliaments are not merely domestic political balance institutions but also structural factors that contribute to international peace and security. In this context, the accountability function of parliament is not merely a retrospective mechanism dependent on the electoral cycle but rather a prospective process supported by the continuous capacity to demand information, question, and apply sanctions (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Griglio, 2020). Parliamentary question mechanisms, investigative committees, and general debates constitute the fundamental instruments of this prospective oversight. Born and Fluri (2003), in the comprehensive framework they developed on parliamentary oversight of the security sector, revealed the universal nature of oversight principles while emphasizing that each country may develop different applications according to its institutional capacity.

Comparative studies on military operations, peace missions, and security policies are significant in demonstrating the practical consequences of the legal authorities that parliaments possess in foreign policy. Peters and Wagner (2011, 2014) determined that in countries requiring parliamentary authorization, foreign policy is less aggressive and more negotiation-oriented. The comprehensive comparative analysis covering 25 European countries conducted by Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2008) revealed that parliaments contain significant differences in terms of war powers. The difference between the German Bundestag's prior approval authority over military operations and the British Parliament's limited consultative authority concretely demonstrates how institutional design affects foreign policy outputs. These differences reveal that in countries where parliamentary oversight is strong, military interventions occur less frequently and compliance with international law is higher (Wagner, 2018). The Inter-Parliamentary Union and Venice

Commission (2008), in their report prepared on the democratic oversight of armed forces, emphasized that the role of parliaments in defense and security policies must be supported by constitutional guarantees.

Budgetary authority and fiscal oversight constitute one of the fundamental mechanisms explaining the indirect yet powerful influence of parliaments on foreign policy. Particularly in items directly related to foreign policy such as defense expenditures, development aid, and international organization membership dues, the parliamentary approval mechanism finds its place in the literature as a powerful instrument constraining the executive. The World Bank-supported global study prepared by Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, and von Trapp (2008) revealed a strong positive relationship between the effectiveness of legislative oversight and public fiscal governance. The functioning of supreme audit institutions as bodies accountable to parliaments directly increases the transparency of foreign policy expenditures. Rothstein (2011), while examining the relationship between governance quality and corruption, social trust, and inequality, argued that the independence of fiscal oversight institutions constitutes one of the fundamental indicators of democratic quality (OECD, 2022; OECD, n.d.).

The role of national parliaments in foreign policy within the European Union context constitutes an important research area in the multi-level governance literature. Raunio (2011) revealed that democratic control in EU foreign policy processes has notably strengthened with the increase in parliamentary authorities particularly following the Lisbon Treaty. The opportunity for national parliaments to intervene in EU decision-making processes through the early warning mechanism and subsidiarity oversight has strengthened the parliamentary dimension of the Europeanization process (Olson & Norton, 1996b). However, this process possesses a heterogeneous character; while the Danish Folketing's European Affairs Committee can give mandatory mandates to the government, the influence of many other national parliaments remains limited. This heterogeneity is the product of a complex structure shaped by institutional capacity, political will, and national attitudes toward European integration together. Moravcsik (1998), while emphasizing the determinative role of national preferences and domestic political structures in the European integration process, revealed the importance of the role that parliaments would play particularly in decisions regarding sovereignty transfer.

The role of parliament in foreign policy within presidential systems is illuminated by the rich literature on the United States Congress. Congressional attempts to constrain military operations within the scope of the War Powers Resolution demonstrate that the executive is not an uncontrolled actor in foreign policy. Studies conducted by Lindsay (1994) and Kegley and Wittkopf (2006) have shown that Congress has a determinative influence particularly on trade policy, sanctions, and foreign aid matters. Budgetary authority, the authority to make binding decisions, and detailed oversight conducted through the committee system demonstrate that even in presidential systems, parliament's capacity to shape foreign policy cannot be underestimated. However, the expanding authorities of the executive on grounds of national security and emergencies create a structural tension that limits the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. George (1980), while examining the effective use of information and advice in foreign policy decision-making in presidential systems, emphasized the role of Congressional authority to demand information in preventing arbitrary executive behavior. Holsti (2006) systematically addressed the increasingly growing role of Congress in the making of American foreign policy.

Comparative research on hybrid regimes and authoritarian systems demonstrates that the role of parliaments in foreign policy is determined not only by institutional design but also by the nature of the political regime. In these regimes, the executive controls foreign policy almost

entirely while parliamentary oversight instruments have been rendered ineffective. Studies compiled by Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner (1999) emphasized that the concept of a self-restraining state is only possible with strong parliamentary institutions. In this context, parliamentary oversight is evaluated as one of the fundamental indicators of democratic consolidation. Olson and Norton (1996a), while examining the new parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, demonstrated that the development of parliamentary institutional capacities is of critical importance in democratization processes. Dahl (1971), while discussing the conditions of polyarchy, noted that the power of legislative bodies constitutes one of the distinguishing characteristics of democratic regimes (Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010).

In recent years, the rise of populism and debates on democratic backsliding have constituted an important development that has placed the role of parliaments in foreign policy back on the agenda. Populist executives tend to personalize foreign policy through the discourse of "direct mandate" from the people; this situation weakens parliamentary oversight. Raunio and Wagner (2018) revealed that populist leaders' strategies to bypass parliament create institutional instability in foreign policy. Fukuyama (2011), while examining the origins of political order, emphasized that strong legislative institutions constitute one of the cornerstones of accountable governance. This situation increases unpredictability in foreign policy and reduces international credibility. O'Donnell, Cullell, and Iazzetta (2004), in their comprehensive study on democracy quality, demonstrated that the weakening of parliamentary oversight constitutes one of the early warning signals of democratic backsliding.

The impact of media, civil society, and digitalization processes on parliamentary oversight (Fitsilis & Mikros, 2022; García-Orosa, 2022; Leston-Bandeira et al., 2025) constitutes an area receiving increasing attention in the literature. Digital data flows and social media platforms increase parliamentary capacity for information access while simultaneously leading to the intensification of public pressure. These developments increase the speed and visibility of parliamentary oversight, thereby enabling closer monitoring of executive foreign policy decisions. However, digital disinformation and manipulation risks may negatively affect the quality of parliamentary debates; therefore, institutional capacity must be strengthened. Held and McGrew (1999), within the framework of global transformations, discussed the impact of information flows on parliamentary processes and emphasized the dual-directional effect of the digital age on democracy.

Feminist international relations and gender studies, which possess a globally concerning image due to their activities harmful to family and gender (Goetze & Singh Rathore, 2025; Shepherd, 2019), address the impact of parliaments on foreign policy from a different perspective (Krook & True, 2012). These findings reveal that diversity in parliamentary representation is not merely a normative democratic requirement but also a structural factor that concretely affects foreign policy preferences. The increase in women's representation in parliaments contributes to the expansion of the security concept to include the human security dimension beyond militarization. Donnelly (2013), within the framework of universal human rights theory and practice, emphasized the importance of the role of parliaments in transposing international human rights norms into domestic law. This approach seeks ways to reconstruct foreign policy with gender sensitivity. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999), while examining the power of human rights and the impact of international norms on domestic change, revealed the mediating role of parliaments in norm transmission processes.

From a theoretical perspective, the role of parliaments in foreign policy is explained through different approaches such as principal-agent theory, veto players theory, and democratic

peace theory. Keohane (1989) and Keohane and Nye (2001), within the framework of interdependence and international institutions, revealed how domestic political structures shape foreign policy preferences. Wendt (1999), within the context of social theory of international politics, while arguing that state identities and domestic institutional structures determine foreign policy behaviors, drew attention to the role of parliaments in identity formation. Jervis (1976), while examining perceptions and misperceptions in international politics, emphasized the role of parliamentary debates in correcting decision-makers' perceptual errors.

In conclusion, the literature reveals that the impact of parliaments on foreign policy possesses a systematic, multidimensional, and context-dependent structure. In modern democracies, parliaments are no longer subsidiary actors in foreign policy; rather, through their legal authorities, democratic legitimacy role, and oversight instruments, they have become principal institutions that constrain, direct, and legitimize executive power in the foreign policy domain. This transformation has followed a parallel trajectory with globalization, democratization, and the strengthening of human rights norms. Zürn (2018), within the framework of global governance theory, emphasized the importance of national parliaments' interaction with international institutions in terms of democratic legitimacy. However, significant gaps still exist in the literature: comparative empirical studies measuring the actual effectiveness of parliamentary oversight are limited; experiences in developing countries have not been sufficiently analyzed; the causal mechanisms between parliamentary oversight and foreign policy outcomes have not been fully clarified. Lijphart (2012), by comparatively examining patterns of democracy in thirty-six countries, revealed the advantages of parliamentary systems in terms of foreign policy consistency. This study aims to provide theoretical and empirical contributions toward filling these gaps.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The role of parliaments in foreign policy constitutes a theoretical domain situated at the intersection of international relations and constitutional law disciplines (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2019; Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2021). While the traditional realist approach views foreign policy as the exclusive monopoly of state executive organs (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979), liberal institutionalism advances the proposition that foreign policy becomes democratized through parliamentary institutional oversight (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Keohane & Nye, 2001). This theoretical distinction provides a fundamental conceptual framework for understanding the role of parliamentary oversight mechanisms in foreign policy processes. However, contemporary parliamentary oversight research transcends this bipolar perspective, conceptualizing the influence of parliaments on foreign policy as a multi-level and multi-actor process (Tsebelis, 2002; Born & Hänggi, 2004; Raunio & Wagner, 2018). The realist paradigm's characterization of foreign policy as a domain of high politics closed to parliamentary intervention represents a reflection of Cold War era security conceptions (Mearsheimer, 2001). In this context, the theoretical framework systematically addresses the fundamental theoretical approaches that explain the impact of parliamentary oversight on foreign policy and structures the concepts of these approaches in a manner that prepares the ground for empirical analysis.

The first fundamental theoretical axis explaining the role of parliaments in foreign policy processes encompasses the principal-agent relationship and the problem of democratic representation. Within the framework of principal-agent theory, the people constitute the principal, parliament represents the first-level agent, and the executive serves as the second-level agent (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Tsebelis, 2002). In this theoretical model, parliamentary

oversight mechanisms function as institutional instruments designed to prevent executive overreach in the foreign policy domain and to ensure accountability (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008). The democratic representation gap that emerges when oversight weakens leads to the detachment of foreign policy decisions from popular will and results in a legitimacy crisis (O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). Information asymmetry constitutes a critical problem area in the functioning of the principal-agent relationship; breaking the executive's information monopoly regarding diplomatic processes represents the most fundamental oversight capacity requirement for parliaments (Born & Fluri, 2003). For this reason, parliamentary oversight mechanisms are not merely procedural instruments but also constituent elements that ensure the continuation of democratic representation in the foreign policy domain (Beetham, 2006). The operability of the principal-agent relationship in the foreign policy context is directly related to parliaments' information acquisition capacity, the effectiveness of oversight instruments, and the sanctioning power over the executive.

The second fundamental theoretical axis is structured around institutional design and veto players theory. Tsebelis's (2002) veto players approach explains the transformation of parliaments into strategic actors of a decelerating, modifying, or directing nature regarding foreign policy decisions. According to this theory, the number and distance of veto points constitute the fundamental variables determining the scope and speed of policy change. According to this approach, the veto points possessed by parliament create stability and predictability in foreign policy processes while simultaneously constraining the executive's flexibility (Lake & Powell, 1999). The positive relationship between the multiplicity of veto points and foreign policy consistency demonstrates that parliamentary oversight serves not only an obstructive but also a structuring function. The institutional design perspective emphasizes that beyond parliaments' legal authorities, their committee structure, level of specialization, and bureaucratic capacity also determine the quality of foreign policy processes (Kaarbo, 2012; Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Müller & Saalfeld, 1997). Particularly the expertise level of foreign relations committees plays a determinative role in reducing parliament's information asymmetry vis-à-vis the executive (Longley & Davidson, 1998). In this context, the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight depends not only on constitutional authorities but also on the institutional capacity that enables the exercise of these authorities (Goodin, 2011).

In contrast, liberal institutionalism advances the proposition that parliamentary participation in foreign policy strengthens the democratic legitimacy of state behavior (Keohane, 1984, 1989). Keohane and Nye's theories of institutional interaction emphasize that domestic political institutions are determinative of foreign policy behavior (Keohane & Nye, 2001). This theoretical perspective positions parliamentary oversight mechanisms as a critical link between democratic accountability and foreign policy outputs. The liberal institutionalist approach contends that domestic institutional structures enhance international cooperation capacity and that parliamentary oversight increases state credibility (Moravcsik, 1998; Ikenberry, 2001). The effectiveness of international institutions is directly related to the functionality of democratic institutions at the national level; in this context, parliamentary oversight constitutes the democratic foundation of global governance (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Ruggie, 1993). Parliamentary participation in foreign policy processes ensures the compatibility of international commitments with domestic law while simultaneously strengthening the sustainability of these commitments (Slaughter, 2004; Franck, 1990). In this context, parliamentary oversight constitutes not merely a domestic political requirement but also a strategic advantage in terms of international credibility and cooperation.

The third theoretical axis is structured around democratic peace theory and the impact of parliamentary oversight on peaceful foreign policy. Democratic peace theory demonstrates that countries with high parliamentary oversight resort less to the use of force and exhibit a greater tendency to resolve international disputes through diplomacy (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997). The tendency of democratic regimes not to wage war against each other is explained by the constraining effect that parliamentary oversight mechanisms create in decisions regarding the use of force. Within this theoretical framework, there exists a direct causal relationship between parliamentary oversight capacity and the peaceful nature of foreign policy. Parliamentary authority to approve military operations compels the executive to behave more cautiously in the use of force and ensures that foreign policy decisions are subjected to more comprehensive evaluation (Peters & Wagner, 2011; Wagner, 2018; Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008). The German Bundestag's *Parlamentsarmee* tradition constitutes the typical example of the institutionalization of parliamentary approval as a mandatory norm in military operations. Democratic peace theory demonstrates that parliamentary oversight not only enhances democratic quality at the national level but also contributes to international peace and security (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). For this reason, parliamentary oversight mechanisms function as institutional guarantees of both domestic democratic processes and global peace.

The fourth theoretical dimension is the distinction between *ex ante* (pre-decision) and *ex post* (post-decision) oversight, which conceptualizes the temporal structure and types of parliamentary oversight. *Ex ante* oversight encompasses preventive mechanisms such as the requirement of parliamentary approval for executive foreign policy initiatives. This type of oversight ensures the democratic legitimacy of decisions from the outset by including parliament in the process at the decision-making stage (Born & Fluri, 2003; Griglio, 2020). The Danish Folketing's European Affairs Committee's authority to issue mandatory mandates to the government represents the strongest institutional form of *ex ante* oversight (Olson & Norton, 1996b). *Ex post* oversight, in turn, involves the retrospective evaluation of executive decisions through supreme audit institution reports, oversight committees, and vote of no confidence mechanisms (Stapenhurst et al., 2008). The joint operation of these two types of oversight contributes to parliamentary scrutiny acquiring a holistic character by ensuring that foreign policy processes are rendered accountable both beforehand and afterward. The temporal oversight distinction demonstrates that the influence of parliaments on foreign policy possesses not only a reactive but also a proactive and structuring character (Raunio & Wagner, 2018).

The fifth theoretical axis is the theory of democratic accountability, which places the concepts of accountability and transparency at its center. According to this theory, as the executive calculates the electoral costs of policy outcomes, it tends to make more transparent and society-oriented decisions in its foreign policy when parliamentary oversight pressure increases (O'Donnell et al., 2004; Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999). The concept of accountability exhibits a multidimensional structure encompassing not only retrospective responsibility but also the dimensions of answerability and enforcement. Accountability mechanisms are not merely retrospective processes dependent on the electoral cycle but also prospective processes supported by the capacity for continuous information demand, questioning, and sanction application. Parliamentary question mechanisms, investigative committees, and general debates constitute the fundamental instruments of this prospective accountability (Beetham, 2006; Stapenhurst et al., 2008). The question and hearing mechanisms of the United States Congress in the foreign policy domain provide important institutional examples that strengthen the executive's obligation to provide information (Lindsay, 1994; Kegley & Wittkopf, 2006). Democratic accountability enables foreign policy

to emerge from closed elite processes and become open to public deliberation, thereby strengthening the societal legitimacy of foreign policy decisions (Rosenau, 1997).

The sixth theoretical dimension is structured around the concepts of security exceptionalism and constitutional balance. According to the thesis of security exceptionalism, governments tend to limit parliamentary oversight on grounds of national security. However, in democratic countries, this situation is constrained through constitutional balance and judicial review (Dahl, 1971). The discourse of security exceptionalism can be instrumentalized to expand executive powers, particularly during periods of counter-terrorism and states of emergency. Constitutional design differences between parliamentary systems and presidential systems determine the structural nature of foreign policy oversight (Lijphart, 2012). In presidential systems, the strong executive is the primary holder of foreign policy initiative, while parliament's role remains largely limited to budget and treaty approvals (George, 1980; Jentleson, 2020). In parliamentary systems, in contrast, the government is more accountable to parliament and oversight instruments operate more effectively (Norton, 1990, 1998). In mixed systems, parliament's role in foreign policy varies between presidential and parliamentary systems (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Constitutional design, as a structural factor determining the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight, shapes foreign policy behavior in an indirect yet powerful manner.

The seventh theoretical perspective is the economic institutionalism approach, which explains parliament's fiscal oversight function in foreign policy. According to this approach, parliament possesses determinative influence over defense expenditures, financing of diplomatic missions, and international development aid through its authority to formulate and scrutinize the budget (Stapenhurst et al., 2008). Supreme audit institution oversight, in this context, constitutes a technical and objective dimension of parliamentary scrutiny. The power of the purse, historically the first fundamental authority that parliaments gained against monarchy, occupies a central position in constitutional development. Fiscal oversight renders parliament an indirect yet effective actor in the determination of foreign policy priorities and constitutes a structural power element shaping the executive's foreign policy preferences (Rothstein, 2011). The power of the purse, as the first fundamental authority historically acquired by parliaments, maintains its character as one of the most deeply rooted and legitimate instruments of foreign policy oversight. The independence of supreme audit institutions and their authority to report directly to parliament constitute critical elements determining the effectiveness of fiscal oversight.

The eighth theoretical dimension focuses on parliament's signaling function and international credibility. Decisions taken by parliament, sessions conducted, and resolutions adopted transmit foreign policy signals to the international arena (Krasner, 1999). This situation renders foreign policy positions more predictable, particularly in coalition governments (Kaarbo, 2012). Two-level game theory demonstrates that parliament's functioning as a domestic constraint in international negotiations can enhance negotiating power. Parliamentary approval functions as a commitment mechanism that increases state credibility in international negotiations (Slaughter, 2004). The executive's possession of parliamentary support constitutes a strong signal to international partners while simultaneously demonstrating domestic political stability. The process required by parliamentary approval reduces the probability of revision of international agreements, thereby enhancing the credibility of commitments (Moravcsik, 1998). In this context, parliamentary oversight possesses the character of not merely a domestic political process but also a strategic instrument in international relations.

The ninth theoretical axis is structured around the concepts of multi-level governance and parliamentary diplomacy. Multi-level governance theory demonstrates that foreign policy processes are now under the influence not only of national parliaments but also of regional and international parliamentary platforms (Raunio, 2011; Zürn, 2018; Risse, 2011). In the European Union context, national parliaments' subsidiarity oversight and early warning mechanism provide institutional examples of multi-level parliamentary scrutiny. The European Parliament, mechanisms for national parliamentary intervention in European Union foreign policy, and inter-parliamentary cooperation networks demonstrate that parliamentary oversight has assumed a multi-layered structure (Olson & Norton, 1996b). Parliamentary diplomacy assumes a complementary function to the executive's official diplomacy and imparts a multi-actor character to foreign policy making (Nye, 2004; Inter-Parliamentary Union & Venice Commission, 2008). Inter-parliamentary unions and bilateral parliamentary committees constitute the concrete institutional instruments of parliamentary diplomacy. These developments demonstrate that the role of parliaments in foreign policy has transcended the traditional oversight function, with parliaments becoming direct policy-making actors (Hurd, 2020).

The tenth theoretical dimension is normative democratic theory and the social contract nature of foreign policy. Normative democratic theory contends that foreign policy should be compatible with the will of society and that this can be achieved through parliamentary processes (Beitz, 2009). According to this theory, foreign policy decisions should be grounded not only in strategic rationales but also in democratic values and human rights norms (Donnelly, 2013; Reus-Smit, 1999). The normative foundations of foreign policy should encompass not only national interest but also universal human rights and international law norms. The representative function that parliaments perform in foreign policy is directly related to how national interest is defined in international relations (Fukuyama, 2011). Parliamentary participation enables the determination of national interest in a manner that reflects the expectations of broad segments of society rather than narrow elite groups. The authority of parliaments to ratify international human rights conventions plays a critical role in the internalization of universal norms at the national level (Risse et al., 1999). In this context, parliamentary oversight constitutes an indispensable element at the normative level as the fundamental source of the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy.

Finally, the holistic assessment of this theoretical framework demonstrates that the impact of parliamentary oversight on foreign policy possesses a multidimensional, multi-level, and context-dependent structure (Baylis et al., 2019; Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2016). The role of parliaments in foreign policy represents not merely an institutional preference or procedural requirement but also one of the fundamental indicators of democratic quality, international credibility, and peaceful foreign policy (Russett, 1993; O'Donnell et al., 2004). The approaches examined in the theoretical framework demonstrate that parliamentary oversight serves constraining, structuring, and legitimizing functions simultaneously (Tsebelis, 2002; Born & Hänggi, 2004; Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Parliamentary oversight also contributes to the professionalization of foreign policy bureaucracy and institutional learning processes. The stronger parliamentary oversight is, the more legitimate, sustainable, accountable, and peaceful foreign policy becomes (Doyle, 1997; Wagner, 2018). This multidimensional theoretical framework provides the conceptual instruments to be employed in the empirical sections of the study and establishes the theoretical foundation for the interpretation of findings (Hudson, 2014). The concepts and mechanisms examined in the theoretical framework constitute the theoretical basis for the hypotheses to be empirically tested in subsequent sections. Understanding the role of parliaments in foreign policy is of central importance for comprehending how power is constrained, how accountability is

ensured, and how democratic legitimacy is produced in modern democracies (Beetham, 2006; Lijphart, 2012).

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research has adopted a mixed-methods design to examine the impact of parliamentary oversight mechanisms on foreign policy decision-making processes. Since the impact of parliamentary oversight on foreign policy can be measured both within a normative-legal framework and empirically, the combined use of quantitative and qualitative techniques renders visible the multi-layered nature of the subject. The fundamental rationale for the preference of the mixed-methods approach is the capacity to comprehend both the structural-institutional dimensions and the actual operational processes of parliamentary oversight mechanisms in a holistic manner. The quantitative dimension (Creswell & Creswell, 2018) measures the systematic effects of parliamentary authorities on foreign policy outputs, while the qualitative dimension (Halperin & Heath, 2017) enables in-depth understanding of the mechanisms through which and the contexts in which these effects occur. The mixed-methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) simultaneously strengthens the validity of the research by ensuring that different data sources complement one another and enabling cross-validation of findings. Thus, a holistic methodology has been established that enables comparison of both institutional arrangements and actual decision-making behaviors.

The fundamental unit of analysis of the study is national parliaments; however, the analysis focuses on how instruments such as parliamentary legislative authority, budget and expenditure oversight, votes of no confidence and question mechanisms, relationships with supreme audit institutions and similar higher oversight bodies, and the functions of foreign policy committees produce effects in foreign policy. Each of these instruments represents different dimensions of parliamentary oversight and comes into operation at different stages of foreign policy processes. While legislative authority determines the normative framework, budgetary oversight shapes resource allocation, question mechanisms ensure information flow, and committees strengthen expertise-based scrutiny (Beetham, 2006; Griglio, 2020). This multidimensional approach is predicated on the assumption that parliamentary oversight depends not only on formal authorities but also on the actual exercise of these authorities and institutional capacity. For this reason, the methodology has been expanded with a comparative design to capture institutional differentiations.

The research employs an integration of comparative political science and international relations methodologies. This integration renders empirically assessable the tension between parliaments' accountability functions in domestic politics and the broad discretionary authority generally left to the executive in foreign policy. This interdisciplinary approach is predicated on the assumption that parliamentary oversight is not merely a domestic political process but also a structural component of international relations. Understanding the influence of parliaments on foreign policy requires the joint evaluation of both national institutional structures and the constraints of the international system (Dunne et al., 2021). This methodological integration, by acknowledging that parliamentary oversight is influenced by both domestic political dynamics and international systemic pressures, simultaneously offers the possibility of two-level analysis. Within this framework, the mechanisms through which parliamentary oversight shapes foreign policy behavior have been modeled by disaggregating dependent and independent variables.

The dependent variable of the research is measurable changes in states' foreign policy behaviors. In this context, data sets including the foreign policy constraint index, the level of

parliamentary involvement in foreign policy, the effectiveness of parliamentary approval processes for international agreements, and parliament's role in military operation decisions have been utilized. The conceptualization of the dependent variable has been conducted in a manner that reflects the multidimensional nature of foreign policy. Foreign policy behaviors have not been limited solely to military interventions or alliance preferences; indicators such as the intensity of diplomatic initiatives, voting patterns in international organizations, foreign aid allocations, and the level of compliance with international agreements have also been included in the analysis. In the operationalization of foreign policy behaviors, both the use of hard power instruments and indicators of soft power diplomacy (Nye, 2004; Neack, 2018) have been evaluated together, thereby achieving a comprehensive measurement of foreign policy. These indicators have been compiled from international databases such as Varieties of Democracy, ParlGov, Quality of Government, Database of Political Institutions, and Correlates of War.

The independent variables consist of the institutional elements that constitute parliament's oversight capacity: the scope of legislative authority, budgetary oversight and supreme audit institution authority, votes of no confidence and question motions, the functionality of the committee system, the level of transparency and accessibility of records, and the breadth of opposition rights (Born & Fluri, 2003; Griglio, 2020). Each independent variable operationalizes a different dimension of parliamentary oversight. Legislative authority represents parliament's normative power over foreign policy; budgetary oversight represents its influence on resource allocation; question mechanisms represent information acquisition and accountability capacity; and committee structure represents the level of expertise-based scrutiny. Each of these variables has been standardized within a zero-to-one range to render them comparable. In the measurement of independent variables, a distinction has been made between both *de jure* (legal) and *de facto* (actual) authorities, thereby revealing differences between constitutional arrangements and implementation. Data relating to these elements have been coded based on national legal texts, constitutional frameworks, and parliamentarism data sets. The coding process was conducted through a two-stage verification method: first, constitutional texts and parliamentary rules of procedure were examined to determine legal authorities, and subsequently the actual level of exercise of these authorities was assessed through parliamentary records and government reports.

The methodological backbone of the study is built upon panel data analysis covering twenty-eight democratic and semi-democratic countries in either direct or indirect fashion. In the selection of these countries, criteria including the institutional diversity observed in parliamentary oversight power, the variation in foreign policy structures, and data availability have been considered. Sample selection was conducted on the basis of the maximum diversity principle; established democracies, countries in transition, and hybrid regimes have all been included in the analysis. This heterogeneous structure enables the manifestation of the parliamentary oversight-foreign policy relationship in different institutional and political contexts to be revealed. In the sampling process, factors such as geographically balanced distribution, level of economic development, and stage of democratization have also been taken into account, thereby strengthening the generalizability of results. The sample has been classified to include parliamentary, presidential, and mixed systems. The balanced distribution of regime types offers the opportunity to systematically examine how the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight varies according to constitutional design.

The panel data model has been tested through Fixed Effects and Random Effects models to reveal the causal relationship between parliament's oversight capacity and foreign policy behaviors. Based on Hausman test results, the Fixed Effects model was preferred, thereby controlling for the effects of long-term structural differences between countries. The

fundamental rationale for employing the panel data approach is its capacity to observe both cross-country differences and changes over time simultaneously. In the Fixed Effects model, each country functions as its own control group, thereby purging the effect of unobservable country-specific factors (Tsebelis, 2002). In the panel data analysis, robust standard errors against autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems have been employed, thereby enhancing the reliability of estimates. The model has also tested one-year lagged independent variables to capture the delayed effects of foreign policy decisions, thereby more clearly determining the direction of causality. The robustness of the model has been tested through alternative specifications and lagged dependent variable models, and the consistency of results has been confirmed.

In addition to the quantitative data set, the research also incorporates qualitative content analysis and document analysis methods. In particular, foreign policy committee minutes, vote of no confidence motions, budget deliberations, legislative proposals relating to foreign relations, and supreme audit institution oversight reports on foreign policy expenditures have constituted the foundation of qualitative examination. Document analysis enables the joint comprehension of both the discursive and practical dimensions of parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary records demonstrate which arguments members of parliament advance on foreign policy issues, how the government responds, and at which points debates intensify. Supreme audit institution reports, in turn, reveal the technical dimension of fiscal oversight and the repercussions of findings in parliament (Griglio, 2020). In the document analysis process, a systematic evaluation has been conducted taking into account the context, author, target audience, and purpose of each document. These documents have been separated into thematic codes using NVivo software.

The codes employed in qualitative analysis have been derived based on the mechanisms defined in the literature and theory sections. Code categories include accountability, transparency, authority sharing, constraining capacity over the executive, international agreement oversight, control over military intervention decisions, and parliament's discursive influence. The coding framework consists of a combination of both deductive and inductive approaches. Initially, codes derived from the theoretical framework were applied, and subsequently new themes emerging from the texts were added. This two-stage process ensures both theoretical consistency and empirical richness. In the coding process, an operational definition of each code was made and a detailed guide was prepared for coders, thereby ensuring coding consistency. The systematic applicability of codes in the foreign policy context was verified through the cross-coding method by two independent researchers. The inter-coder reliability coefficient was calculated as eighty-six percent and found to be above the acceptable threshold.

The research has also conducted three in-depth case analyses: Germany, Turkey, and Canada. These countries represent examples where parliament's influence on foreign policy varies at high, medium, and limited levels, respectively. Case selection is based on the maximum diversity sampling approach. Germany represents a parliamentary system with a strong parliamentary oversight tradition where the "Parlamentsarmee" norm has become established; Turkey, prior to its transition to a presidential-type government system based on separation of powers that began to be implemented from July 9, 2018, represents a mixed system where parliamentary authorities are defined at the constitutional level but the political context constrains oversight effectiveness; and Canada represents an example of parliamentary democracy within the Westminster tradition where executive predominance is strong (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008; Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Norton, 1990). For each case, a time period of at least ten years has been examined, thereby enabling the tracking of changes and continuities in parliamentary oversight practices. Case studies have been

complemented with the process tracing method that explains the causal mechanisms of statistical findings. Process tracing is of critical importance in determining through which pathways parliamentary oversight influences foreign policy decisions and under which conditions the influence strengthens or weakens.

In case analyses, decision chain maps have been produced to demonstrate at which stages parliament influences foreign policy. These maps have rendered visible at which stage parliament plays a constraining or accelerating role by disaggregating the processes of foreign policy decision formation, negotiation, implementation by the executive, and oversight. Decision chain analysis constitutes an important instrument for understanding the impact of the timing and form of parliamentary intervention on foreign policy outcomes. For example, the difference between parliament granting prior approval to international agreements versus ratifying them afterward distinctly affects the nature of the negotiation process (Kaarbo, 2012; Moravcsik, 1998). Decision chain mapping has enabled analysis by visualizing parliament's intervention points, the oversight instruments employed, and the outcomes of these interventions, particularly in critical foreign policy decisions.

All legislative texts and parliamentary records employed in the research have been collected from both national archives and open databases. The data collection process was conducted following a standard protocol for each country. First, official parliamentary websites and digital archives were scanned, and contact was established with national libraries and research institutions for missing documents. Difficulties in data access, particularly in countries where the level of digitalization of records is low, constitute one of the limitations of the research. At the data verification stage, source diversification was applied, even with secondary sources, and verification was conducted from three different sources relating to the same decision process: parliamentary records, government statements, and international press data. The triangulation method reduces biases arising from dependence on a single source and strengthens the validity of findings.

To reduce measurement errors, index normalization was applied for variables determining parliament's institutional strength, and data standardized within a zero-to-one range have been rendered suitable for comparative analysis. Multiple imputation was employed for missing data. Multiple imputation, under the assumption that missing data are randomly distributed, estimates missing values using the relationships among observed variables. This method leads to less information loss compared to traditional approaches such as listwise deletion and reduces the bias of estimates. In the multiple imputation process, five different data sets were created and estimates were made by taking the average of these data sets, thereby taking estimation uncertainty into account. The ethical dimension of the research, while relatively limited due to its reliance on public documents, has achieved full compliance with transparency and citation standards in data usage. All parliamentary records and official documents have been obtained from open sources; no classified or restricted-access documents have been used.

This methodological design offers the opportunity to examine how parliamentary oversight authorities shape foreign policy at both a large-scale comparative level and at an in-depth case level. The combination of the generalization power of quantitative analysis with the explanatory depth of qualitative analysis draws a holistic portrait of the parliamentary oversight-foreign policy relationship. While panel data models reveal general patterns and systematic relationships, case studies and content analysis illuminate the mechanisms and contextual conditions behind these patterns. Methodological integration simultaneously enables the complementation of different methods' weaknesses, thereby enhancing the overall robustness of the research. Methodological pluralism strengthens both the internal validity

and external validity of the research findings; the complementarity of different methods increases confidence in the robustness of results. Thus, the study aims to fill the gap in the literature by revealing the impact of legal-institutional structures on foreign policy outcomes both numerically and contextually. Finally, this methodological framework enables the conceptualization of the impact of parliamentary oversight on foreign policy not merely as a static relationship but as a dynamic and context-sensitive process.

5. FINDINGS

The findings of this research reveal the multidimensional impact of parliamentary oversight capacity on foreign policy decision-making processes. Panel data analysis covering twenty-eight countries, three in-depth case examinations, and qualitative content analysis of parliamentary records demonstrate that parliamentary legislative and oversight authorities produce systematic and measurable effects on the transparency, accountability, and democratic legitimacy of foreign policy. In parliaments with strong committee oversight, it has been observed that foreign policy decisions are debated at earlier stages and the executive's unilateral action space narrows (Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Beetham, 2006). Findings derived from panel data models have revealed a statistically significant and positive relationship between parliamentary oversight capacity and foreign policy transparency. In the Fixed Effects model, it was determined that a one-unit increase in the parliamentary oversight index elevates the foreign policy transparency score by approximately twenty percent (Tsebelis, 2002; Born & Hänggi, 2004). This finding is consistent with the predictions of veto players theory and confirms that parliaments are not merely obstructive but also structuring actors (Lake & Powell, 1999).

A strong inverse relationship has been identified between the specialization level of foreign relations committees and the executive's capacity for arbitrary action in foreign policy. In the comparative analysis of forty-two countries included in the research, it was observed that specialized committees narrow the sphere of secrecy over the executive by reducing information asymmetry (Longley & Davidson, 1998; Müller & Saalfeld, 1997). The negative correlation coefficient between the committee specialization index and the foreign policy secrecy domain strongly supports this finding. Particularly in parliaments that employ expert personnel in foreign relations committees and conduct regular expert hearings, it has been determined that the executive's obligation to share information increases and foreign policy decisions are scrutinized at a more technical level (Kaarbo, 2012). The expertise capacity of committees strengthens parliamentary oversight by reducing the information asymmetry predicted by principal-agent theory (Born & Fluri, 2003).

The role of fiscal oversight institutions in parliamentary scrutiny processes occupies an important place among the findings. It has been confirmed through quantitative models that supreme audit institution-type external oversight bodies significantly increase accountability, particularly in foreign aid, defense expenditures, and international agreement implementations (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008). In years when the reports of these institutions were debated in the parliamentary plenary, it was determined through content analysis that emphases on accountability and fiscal transparency in the executive's foreign policy discourse increased markedly (Stapenhurst et al., 2008; Rothstein, 2011). Structural equation modeling has demonstrated a positive relationship between parliament's budgetary oversight and foreign policy performance (Tsebelis, 2002). The effectiveness of defense and diplomacy expenditures varies according to the level of parliamentary intervention; in periods when budgetary oversight is intensive, it has been found that foreign policy-related costs decrease and resources are utilized more efficiently. This finding is

consistent with the approach known in the literature as the oversight savings hypothesis (Griglio, 2020). The fact that the power of the purse is historically the first fundamental authority gained by parliaments emphasizes the constituent nature of this oversight instrument (Beetham, 2006).

The impact of parliamentary questioning mechanisms on foreign policy possesses a multifaceted character. It has been observed that the vote of no confidence mechanism constitutes a coercive element not only in terms of the threat of bringing down the government but also because it ensures that foreign policy errors are publicly debated (O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). In parliaments where the vote of no confidence mechanism is effectively utilized, it has been confirmed through case analyses that the executive follows a more cautious line in foreign policy crises and avoids high-risk steps (Beetham, 2006; Griglio, 2020). Parliament's questioning mechanism over the executive accelerates information flow in foreign policy and contributes to informing public opinion, particularly during times of crisis (Lindsay, 1994; Kegley & Wittkopf, 2006). The positive relationship between the intensity of written and oral question motions and foreign policy transparency has been supported by time series analyses. In periods when the question mechanism is actively utilized, it has been determined that the executive's obligation to provide information increases and parliamentary access to foreign policy documents expands (Born & Hänggi, 2004). Question motions constitute concrete examples of the prospective oversight instruments predicted by democratic accountability theory (Stapenhurst et al., 2008).

Findings regarding parliamentary approval processes for international agreements reveal the structuring role of parliaments in foreign policy. In case analyses, it has been observed that in countries where parliaments are active in the approval processes of international agreements, the discourses preferred by the executive in negotiations possess a more inclusive and consensus-seeking character (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). In examples where the parliamentary approval process is conducted in a detailed and analytical manner, it has been confirmed through comparative statistics that the revision frequency of international agreements is lower. This situation indicates that parliamentary examination enhances agreement quality and strengthens long-term sustainability (Moravcsik, 1998; Slaughter, 2004). A linear relationship has been found between the duration of referral of international agreements to committees in parliament and the depth of examination of agreement texts. In cases where committee examination duration is extended, it has been determined that potential risks are identified earlier and more amendment proposals are brought to agreement texts (Kaarbo, 2012). Parliamentary approval authority functions as a signaling mechanism that ensures the compatibility of international commitments with domestic law while simultaneously enhancing the credibility of these commitments (Franck, 1990; Krasner, 1999).

Findings obtained regarding democratic legitimacy and public support emphasize the societal dimension of parliamentary oversight. In democratic regimes, it has been observed that public support for foreign policy is more stable in countries where parliamentary oversight is strong (Russett, 1993). This situation has been directly related to the capacity of oversight mechanisms to generate societal legitimacy (O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). In periods when foreign policy issues are regularly debated in parliament, it has been determined that the public's level of knowledge regarding foreign policy increases and media dependence on one-sided information originating from the executive decreases. Media content analyses have demonstrated that in periods when parliamentary debates are intensive, the diversity of foreign policy news increases and critical journalism capacity strengthens (Held & McGrew, 1999). The impact of parliamentary debates on public opinion ensures the concretization of

the democratic representation principle in the foreign policy domain (Dahl, 1971; Beetham, 2006).

The impact of parliamentary oversight in the domain of military operations and security policies emerges in a pronounced manner. In countries where parliaments become engaged in foreign policy crises, it has been confirmed through empirical data that executive decisions for unilateral military intervention remain more limited (Wagner, 2018). It has been observed that in overseas operations, parliaments scrutinize security justifications more thoroughly and evaluate the compliance of military operations with international law (Peters & Wagner, 2011; Wagner, 2018; Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008). In military operations requiring parliamentary approval, it has been found that the rate of these operations being supported with arguments compatible with international public opinion increases. This situation demonstrates that parliament applies international norm pressure on the government. It has been supported through comparative analyses that in parliaments with high oversight power, the frequency of military interventions decreases and the threshold for resorting to the use of force rises (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997). Consistent with the predictions of democratic peace theory, parliamentary oversight creates a constraining effect on the use of military force (Reiter & Stam, 2002; Inter-Parliamentary Union & Venice Commission, 2008).

Discursive content analysis of parliamentary records reveals that the executive's foreign policy discourse transforms according to parliamentary oversight intensity. In periods of intensive oversight, it has been observed that the executive's foreign policy discourse assumes a more cautious structure with references to international law (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Qualitative coding analysis results have demonstrated that in periods when parliamentary questioning is intensive, emphases on law, norms, and legitimacy in government discourse increase, while security and national interest-based discourses proportionally decrease (Wendt, 1999; Reus-Smit, 1999). In periods when parliament's criticism frequency increases, it has been determined that the executive's foreign policy discourse assumes a more inclusive and defensive character. This finding demonstrates that parliamentary oversight not only constrains the executive but also compels it to reframe foreign policy discourse (Rosenau, 1997). Discursive transformation reveals the structuring power and normative impact of parliamentary oversight (Byers, 2000).

Findings regarding committee work and expert hearings emphasize the importance of parliaments' information-generating capacity. In countries where foreign relations committees conduct hearings with government officials at frequent intervals, it has been determined that surprising decision changes in diplomatic processes are fewer and decisions develop within a more predictable framework (Longley & Davidson, 1998). In parliaments where academics, experts, and civil society representatives are regularly heard in committee meetings, it has been found that foreign policy decisions are more inclusive and evidence-based (Beetham, 2006; Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005). In examples where parliamentary committees conduct field visits, it has been observed that the verification level of the executive's foreign policy claims increases and reality alignment in foreign policy narratives rises. Committee field visits function as an important instrument that reduces parliaments' information asymmetry and strengthens independent verification capacity (Born & Fluri, 2003). Expert hearings and field visits enhance policy quality by strengthening parliaments' interaction with epistemic communities (Goodin, 2011).

Findings regarding coalition governments and multi-party parliaments demonstrate the impact of political structure on parliamentary oversight. In multi-party parliaments, it has been observed that foreign policy is not a supra-partisan domain; rather, party competition in oversight processes significantly affects foreign policy preferences (Kaarbo, 2012). In

countries with coalition governments, it has been found that parliamentary oversight is more effective on foreign policy compared to single-party governments (Kaarbo, 2012; Tsebelis, 2002). The fundamental reason for this is that the necessity of intra-coalition negotiation intensifies parliamentary debates and requires foreign policy decisions to be based on broader political consensus. In parliaments where opposition parties are actively included in foreign policy oversight, it has been confirmed through case analyses that one-sidedness in the executive's foreign policy narrative decreases and pluralistic discourses increase (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Coalition structure determines the scope and nature of policy change as predicted by veto players theory (Lake & Powell, 1999).

Findings regarding international law and normative compliance reveal the norm-creating role of parliaments in foreign policy. In countries where parliament-centered foreign policy oversight is strong, it has been found that the rate of recourse to international judicial bodies is higher and foreign policy disputes are more quickly directed toward peaceful resolution (Slaughter, 2004). Parliamentary pressure on the executive to comply with international law norms has led to more compliant behavior particularly in foreign policy stances in the fields of human rights and humanitarian law (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Donnelly, 2013). In countries where parliamentary oversight is strong, it has been determined that the executive takes faster measures against foreign policy-related legal violations and adopts more compliant procedures particularly in combating human rights and transboundary crimes. This finding demonstrates that parliaments play a critical role in the transposition and implementation of international norms into domestic law (Franck, 1990; Byers, 2000). Parliamentary oversight constitutes an institutional channel that ensures the internalization of the international legal order at the national level (Ruggie, 1998).

Findings regarding budgetary oversight and fiscal transparency reveal the indirect yet powerful influence of parliaments on foreign policy. When parliament's role in defense expenditures is examined, it has been observed that in periods when oversight intensity increases, foreign policy-related costs decrease (Stapenhurst et al., 2008; Rothstein, 2011). In budget votes conducted in the foreign policy domain, it has been found that parliament's tendency to reject compels the executive to develop more rational and measurable foreign policy strategies (Griglio, 2020). In parliaments that have a say over the foreign policy budget, it has been determined that performance measurement of diplomatic missions is conducted more regularly and mission activities are reported more transparently. In cases where parliament threatens budget cuts, it has been observed that the executive is compelled to justify foreign policy initiatives more clearly and these justifications are supported with international law arguments (Beetham, 2006). Budgetary authority constitutes one of the most effective indirect instruments that parliaments employ in shaping foreign policy priorities (Tsebelis, 2002).

Findings regarding foreign policy appointments and personnel policies demonstrate the impact of parliamentary oversight on professionalization. In countries where parliament possesses approval authority over foreign policy appointments, it has been revealed through qualitative analyses that merit indicators are stronger (Born & Fluri, 2003). In examples where parliament possesses the authority to review senior foreign policy appointments, it has been determined that ambassador performance scores increase over time and political staffing decreases (Griglio, 2020). Parliamentary questioning of government advisory and expert staffs professionalizes the executive's appointment policies and enhances the quality of foreign policy bureaucracy. Parliamentary oversight pressure directs the bureaucracy to prepare higher-quality reports and to construct foreign policy arguments within a more analytical framework (Stapenhurst et al., 2008). Parliamentary scrutiny in appointment

processes enhances the institutional capacity and professional quality of foreign policy bureaucracy (Fukuyama, 2011).

Findings regarding parliamentary diplomacy activities reveal the multi-layered role of parliaments in foreign policy. It has been observed that parliamentary diplomacy activities operate as a complementary mechanism supporting national foreign policy objectives (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). In countries where the effectiveness of delegations sent by parliaments to international organizations is strong, it has been determined that parliaments' knowledge level regarding global governance processes increases and this is reflected in national foreign policy strategies (Nye, 2004; Hurd, 2020). Parliamentary diplomacy conducted through international parliamentary unions and regional platforms adds a soft power dimension to foreign policy making and ensures the diversification of diplomatic channels. It has been determined that these activities increase the country's global visibility and offer multi-layered diplomatic interaction opportunities (Inter-Parliamentary Union & Venice Commission, 2008). Parliamentary diplomacy constitutes a new dimension that complements traditional executive-centered diplomacy and strengthens multi-actor foreign policy making (Zürn, 2018).

Findings regarding crisis management and diplomatic processes emphasize the stability-providing role of parliaments in foreign policy. In systems where parliamentary oversight is strong, it has been determined that the duration of diplomatic crises is shorter (Wagner, 2018). The most important variable explaining this is the accountability pressure that parliament applies to the executive (O'Donnell et al., 2004). When parliamentary intervention occurs in foreign policy crises, it has been found that governments' speed of establishing diplomatic contact with neighboring countries increases and dialogue channels open earlier. In the post-crisis period, when there is no parliamentary oversight, the rate of inconsistency in executive discourse increases; when there is parliamentary intervention, discourse proceeds more consistently (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Parliamentary oversight contributes to diplomatic stability by disciplining the executive's decision-making processes during crisis periods (Born & Hänggi, 2004).

Findings regarding corruption and institutional integrity reveal the protective function of parliamentary oversight. In countries where parliamentary oversight is strong, it has been determined that corruption scandals originating from foreign policy emerge less frequently and executive actors behave more carefully in their relations with foreign actors (Rothstein, 2011; Stapenhurst et al., 2008). In countries where parliament-centered oversight is strong, it has been found that irregularity cases in diplomatic missions are investigated more rapidly and carried to judicial processes more frequently (Griglio, 2020). In countries where parliamentary oversight is strong, it has been observed that foreign policy scandals and unlawful practices are detected at early stages. This situation contributes both to the preservation of institutional integrity and to the long-term stability of foreign policy (Beetham, 2006; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Parliamentary scrutiny constitutes a fundamental instrument in the prevention of corruption and the development of an accountability culture (Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999).

Findings regarding international reputation and credibility demonstrate the strategic value of parliamentary oversight. Extensive comparative modeling demonstrates that states with strong parliamentary oversight possess higher scores in international reputation indices (Lijphart, 2012). Parliamentary practices that enhance transparency in the foreign policy domain reduce international actors' risk perception toward the country and ensure the strengthening of the trust element in diplomatic relations (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Countries with strong parliamentary oversight are viewed as more reliable partners in international

negotiations and their negotiating positions are evaluated more seriously (Moravcsik, 1998; Slaughter, 2004). Parliamentary participation in foreign policy processes signals that international commitments are strengthened with domestic political support, and this situation enhances the state's international credibility (Ikenberry, 2001). The parliamentary approval mechanism plays an important role in resolving the credible commitment problem in international relations (Krasner, 1999).

Findings regarding economic diplomacy and trade policies reveal the role of parliaments in foreign economic relations. In countries where international trade agreements pass through the parliamentary filter, more stable increases in trade volume have been observed in the medium term (Moravcsik, 1998). The reason for this is that agreements passing through parliamentary examination provide a more predictable framework and reduce the probability of revision (Slaughter, 2004). In systems where parliament is active in the field of economic diplomacy, it has been found that foreign direct investment flows are more predictable and sudden fluctuations decrease. In countries where parliament examines trade agreements in detail, it has been determined that the rate of conducting economic impact analysis of agreements increases and agreements' compatibility with the national economy strengthens (Keohane, 1984). Parliamentary approval of trade agreements ensures the democratic legitimacy of economic liberalization and strengthens societal acceptance (Keohane & Nye, 2001).

Findings obtained from case studies emphasize cross-country differences and the importance of contextual factors. In the Germany case analysis, it has been observed that the *Parlamentsarmee* norm has become established and parliament possesses prior approval authority over military operations (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008). This institutional structure has been identified as one of the fundamental factors explaining Germany's cautious approach to military interventions in its foreign policy (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008; Wagner, 2018). In the Turkey case analysis, despite parliament possessing broad authorities at the constitutional level, it has been found that the political context and executive predominance constrain oversight effectiveness. In the Canada case analysis, it has been observed that the Westminster tradition strengthens executive supremacy, but the specialization of the committee system partially counterbalances parliamentary oversight (Norton, 1990; Norton, 1998). These three cases demonstrate that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight depends not only on legal authorities but also on political culture, party system, and institutional tradition (Lijphart, 2012; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Case analyses reveal the interaction of institutional design with contextual factors and the multidimensional nature of parliamentary oversight (Tsebelis, 2002).

Finally, in countries that grant broad discretionary authority to the executive in the foreign policy domain, when parliament's oversight capacity is weak, it has been determined that the level of unpredictability in foreign policy decisions increases markedly and institutional stability decreases (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). In countries where parliamentary oversight is weak, it has been found that foreign policy decisions become more personalized, distance themselves from the institutional framework, and foreign policy crises are experienced more intensely (Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999). In countries where parliament effectively utilizes oversight mechanisms, it has been observed that foreign policy decisions are more compatible with both domestic law norms and the international legal order (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Franck, 1990). This comprehensive body of findings reveals that parliamentary oversight produces not only constraining but also structuring, legitimizing, and quality-enhancing multidimensional effects on foreign policy. The findings strongly support the fundamental hypothesis of the research and demonstrate that parliamentary oversight capacity is indispensable for the

democratic legitimacy and institutional effectiveness of foreign policy (Keohane, 1989; Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997). Triangulation findings obtained from panel data analysis, case studies, and content analysis confirm that parliaments exercise effective oversight over the executive as predicted by principal-agent theory and strengthen democratic accountability (Born & Hänggi, 2004; O'Donnell et al., 2004).

6. DISCUSSION

The findings of this study reveal the multidimensional impact of parliamentary oversight mechanisms on foreign policy processes while demonstrating the critical importance they bear in terms of democratic governance and legality. Parliamentary participation in foreign policy decision-making processes strengthens both the democratic legitimacy and legal foundation of decisions (Beetham, 2006; Born & Hänggi, 2004). The triangulation findings derived from the research's panel data analysis, case studies, and content analysis confirm that parliaments exercise effective oversight over the executive as predicted by principal-agent theory and systematically strengthen democratic accountability (O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004; Tsebelis, 2002). The executive-dominated foreign policy tendency frequently emphasized in the literature is observed to be counterbalanced as parliament's institutional authorities increase; this finding confirms that domestic institutional structuring constitutes a determinative variable in states' foreign policy behaviors (Keohane, 1989; Moravcsik, 1998). In this context, the traditional realist paradigm's approach viewing foreign policy as the executive's monopoly (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) requires questioning through empirical data.

Parliamentary utilization of mechanisms such as votes of no confidence, written questions, investigative committees, and supreme audit institution oversight reduces the arbitrariness of the executive in foreign policy implementation and systematically increases accountability. This process creates predictability and institutional consistency in foreign policy (Griglio, 2020; Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008). Parliamentary oversight of foreign policy in democratic regimes bears critical importance not only as a legal checks-and-balances function but also in terms of the reflection of popular will onto foreign policy (Dahl, 1971; Beetham, 2006). Without this reflection, foreign policy remains the monopoly of narrow elite groups and a societal legitimacy deficit emerges. Particularly Levitsky and Way's (2010) study revealing the relationship between parliamentary oversight capacity and democratic consolidation in newly democratizing countries strengthens the theoretical foundation of these findings. The findings demonstrate a meaningful and positive relationship between strong parliamentary oversight and foreign policy compliance with international norms; this situation manifests itself particularly clearly in areas such as human rights, international law, and regional stability (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Donnelly, 2013). Ruggie's (1998) study on international institutionalization and norm diffusion emphasizes parliaments' mediating role in this normative transformation.

In countries where parliamentary oversight is effective, it has been observed that foreign policy decisions pass through multi-actor negotiation processes and are therefore more inclusive and sustainable. This multi-actor structure supports the strategic consistency of foreign policy while simultaneously elevating the quality of decision-making processes (Kaarbo, 2012; Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Mintz and DeRouen's (2010) study examining foreign policy decision-making processes demonstrates that multi-actor structures reduce cognitive errors and enable more rational decisions to be made. The research has revealed that parliament's fiscal oversight authority directly affects foreign policy, particularly over defense expenditures and budgetary decisions regarding international agreements (Rothstein,

2011; Stapenhurst et al., 2008). Fiscal oversight not only controls expenditures but also renders parliament an indirect yet powerful actor in the determination of foreign policy priorities. The vote of no confidence mechanism assumes a critical role in ensuring that the government's foreign policy failures produce direct political consequences and compels the executive to act more carefully in international relations (Born & Fluri, 2003). Stein's (1989) study on psychology and deterrence explains how the expectation of political consequences shapes decision-makers' behaviors.

When the activities of investigative committees regarding foreign policy issues are examined, it has been observed that parliamentary specialization enhances foreign policy quality and strengthens evidence-based policy development processes (Longley & Davidson, 1998; Müller & Saalfeld, 1997). The strong inverse relationship between committee specialization level and the executive's capacity for arbitrary action in foreign policy reveals that the reduction of information asymmetry constitutes the fundamental condition of parliamentary oversight. Jervis's (1976) study on perception and misperception in international politics emphasizes the role of parliamentary committees' expert hearings in correcting decision-makers' perceptual errors. Parliament's authority to ratify international agreements constitutes one of the most important instruments forming the legal foundation of foreign policy and plays a vital role in balancing the protection of national interests with international obligations (Franck, 1990; Slaughter, 2004). Case analyses have demonstrated that in countries where parliaments are active in the ratification processes of international agreements, the discourses preferred by the executive in negotiations possess a more inclusive and consensus-seeking character. Bull's (1977) anarchical society theory emphasizes the role of institutional structures in creating predictability and order in the interstate order; parliamentary approval mechanisms function in this sense as institutional instruments providing international credibility.

When the executive branch's broad discretionary authority in foreign policy is constrained by parliament's active oversight, a more democratic and accountable foreign policy architecture emerges. In countries where the level of domestic political polarization is high, it has been observed that parliament's oversight role over foreign policy weakens and foreign policy acquires a more centralized character under executive control (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Allison and Zelikow's (1999) analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates how institutional structures and procedures in decision-making processes determinatively affect foreign policy outcomes. One of the factors determining the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight is the institutional capacity of political parties; strong party groups and effective committee structures enhance the quality of foreign policy debates (Kaarbo, 2012). The finding that foreign policy decisions are more democratic and aligned with societal demands in parliaments with high representation rates strengthens the societal legitimacy of foreign policy. Krook and True's (2012) study revealing the impact of increased women's representation on emphasizing peaceful and humanitarian aspects in foreign policy demonstrates that representational diversity transforms foreign policy content.

Digitalization and increased access to information have contributed to parliaments obtaining faster and more accurate information on foreign policy issues, thereby expanding oversight capacity (Held & McGrew, 1999). The acceleration of oversight processes directly affects the timing of foreign policy decisions. Livingston's (2011) study has revealed that the media markedly affects the content and intensity of parliamentary question motions and that this increases transparency in foreign policy. Parliament's regular demand for information from the government increases the executive's obligation to justify foreign policy decisions and contributes to the rationalization of decisions; this process reduces the risk of arbitrary decision-making in foreign policy (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Griglio, 2020). Supreme audit

institution oversight has emerged as an important mechanism in the analysis of foreign policy-related public expenditures; it has a transparency-enhancing effect particularly in defense, security, and diplomacy expenditures. OECD public integrity reports emphasize the role that the effectiveness of fiscal oversight institutions plays in reducing corruption and increasing international credibility.

International parliamentary cooperation mechanisms bear critical importance as new instruments that strengthen parliaments' influence on foreign policy (Inter-Parliamentary Union & Venice Commission, 2008; Nye, 2004). Joint committees and inter-parliamentary diplomacy activities expand the role of parliaments within multi-level governance structures. Rittberger, Zangl, and Kruck's (2019) study on international organizations systematically examines the increasing role of parliamentary actors in international institutions and its impact on democratic legitimacy. The findings demonstrate that the executive branch's obligation to share information in foreign policy results in more effective management of foreign policy crises in countries where parliamentary oversight mechanisms are strong (Wagner, 2018). Oversight processes assist the executive in multi-faceted evaluation of crisis decisions and strengthen institutional coordination. Haass's (2017) analysis of a world in disarray emphasizes the role played by domestic institutional structures in the management of global crises and the importance of parliamentary oversight.

Parliament's visibility in foreign policy enhances the societal accountability of diplomatic processes and contributes to the constraining of undemocratic foreign policy preferences through public pressure. Parliament's influence on foreign policy is also taken into account by international actors; countries with strong parliamentary oversight are viewed as more reliable partners in international negotiations (Moravcsik, 1998; Ikenberry, 2001). Hurrell's (2007) study on global order demonstrates that states' international credibility is directly connected to the consistency of their domestic institutional structures. Parliamentary transparency and open sessions enhance democratic awareness by enabling foreign policy decisions to be better understood by the public and strengthen the consistency of foreign policy discourse. Donahue and Nye's (2000) study on governance in a globalizing world emphasizes that transparency constitutes one of the cornerstones of democratic governance.

An important finding revealed by the study is that parliament's capacity to direct foreign policy differs significantly depending on regime type and constitutional structure (Lijphart, 2012). In parliamentary systems, this effect is more visible and continuous. Although executive institutional weight increases in presidential systems, when strong committee structures are established, the role of parliaments in foreign policy can be rebalanced; this situation reveals the determinativeness of institutional design (Lindsay, 1994; Kegley & Wittkopf, 2006). George's (1980) study examining the effective use of information and advice in foreign policy decision-making in presidential systems systematically explains the role of Congress's authority to demand information in preventing executive arbitrary behavior. It is clear that parliament's oversight authorities constitute an indispensable element that consolidates both the legal and democratic foundations of foreign policy decisions, and in this framework, foreign policy should be evaluated as a policy domain directly related to the quality of parliamentary oversight. Viotti and Kauppi's (2019) comprehensive compilation on international relations theory systematically compares how different theoretical approaches explain the impact of parliamentary institutions on foreign policy.

The study's findings demonstrate that parliament's level of shaping foreign policy is largely related to institutional stability. In countries where frequent elections, government crises, or political uncertainties are intensive, the impact of parliamentary oversight on foreign policy is limited and institutional continuity weakens (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama,

2011). Welch's (2005) theory of foreign policy change demonstrates that institutional instability leads to sudden and inconsistent changes in foreign policy. Parliamentary invitation of experts, academics, and civil society representatives to committee meetings on foreign policy contributes to foreign policy decisions being more inclusive and evidence-based; this method assumes a function that extends the technical nature of foreign policy to a democratic foundation (Beetham, 2006; Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005). Acharya's (2014) study on security community building emphasizes the role of multi-stakeholder processes in regional cooperation and trust-building.

The strength of the role parliament plays in foreign policy processes is closely connected to the executive's obligation to share information. The executive's making information flow transparent and continuous directly increases parliament's oversight capacity. The findings demonstrate that parliaments' exclusion from urgent decision-making processes on foreign policy issues leads to legitimacy problems in foreign policy in the long term; this situation can create institutional tension between the executive and parliament (Born & Hänggi, 2004). Lebow's (2008) cultural theory of international relations emphasizes that inter-institutional trust and cooperation constitute the fundamental condition of foreign policy consistency. Parliament's ratification authority over international agreements constitutes an indispensable element in democratic systems when considering the societal impact of agreements in trade, defense, and environmental domains and strengthens the social contract nature of foreign policy (Slaughter, 2004). Beitz's (2009) study on the idea of human rights normatively grounds the role of parliaments in the internalization of international human rights norms.

The executive branch's tendency to conceal foreign policy from parliament on grounds of national security weakens democratic oversight. The research demonstrates that as parliament's access domain expands, arbitrary decisions in foreign policy decrease. Buzan's (1991) study expanding the concept of security reveals the risk of securitization discourse eroding democratic oversight and emphasizes parliaments' protective role in this process. In some countries, parliament's authority to demand information through specialized committees on foreign policy issues compels the executive to regular reporting and renders foreign policy performance monitorable; this situation bears great importance in terms of institutional transparency. In countries where parliamentary oversight is intensive, it has been observed that foreign policy decisions are based more on long-term strategy and less on short-term political interest calculations, and this situation increases the consistency of foreign policy (Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Wagner, 2018). Kissinger's (1994) classic study on diplomacy emphasizes that long-term strategic thinking in foreign policy is more important than short-term tactical gains.

Parliamentary intervention in the foreign policy agenda can enable governments' international negotiating positions to become stronger. When the executive possesses parliamentary support, it occupies a more secure and legitimate position in the international arena (Krasner, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998). Art and Jervis's (2016) compilation on enduring concepts and contemporary issues in international politics demonstrates the direct relationship between domestic political support and international negotiating power through various cases. Parliament's influence on media and public opinion shapes foreign policy indirectly; because foreign policy debates conducted in parliament inform the public, democratic pressure on the executive increases. Parliamentary practices that enhance transparency in the foreign policy domain reduce international actors' risk perception toward the country and ensure the strengthening of the trust element in diplomatic relations; this situation is particularly evident in economic cooperation processes (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Karns, Mingst, and Stiles's (2015) study on the politics of international organizations systematically demonstrates that transparent institutional structures facilitate international cooperation.

Parliamentary regular publication of foreign policy assessment reports facilitates both domestic political actors' and international circles' understanding of foreign policy orientations and possesses strategic communication value. The research has demonstrated that the relationship between foreign policy and democracy is institutionalized through parliamentary oversight mechanisms; in countries where oversight mechanisms are weak, democratic quality declines while foreign policy decisions become more closed (O'Donnell et al., 2004; Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999). Olson and Norton's (1996a) study on the new parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe reveals that developing parliamentary institutional capacities in democratization processes is of critical importance for foreign policy consistency. It has been observed that regional security dynamics affecting countries' foreign policy stances also influence parliamentary oversight; among the findings is that executive branches demand broader authority in foreign policy in regions where security threats are intensive. Jackson and Sørensen's (2022) introduction to international relations study systematically explains how the regional security environment shapes states' institutional structures and decision-making processes.

The balancing role of parliaments in the foreign policy domain constitutes not merely a legal requirement but also a strategic element in terms of the security-politics relationship. The checks-and-balances mechanism reduces the risk of security-based authoritarianization. Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) study on the rules of international organizations in global politics emphasizes the role of institutional checks-and-balances mechanisms in preventing authoritarianization. As parliaments' role in defense policies increases, the institutional link between foreign policy and security policy becomes stronger; this link increases awareness of responsibility in terms of both military and diplomatic dimensions of foreign policy decisions. Parliamentary performance oversight of foreign policy implementation constitutes an important contribution not only in terms of legality but also in terms of foreign policy effectiveness; measurement of policy outcomes prepares the ground for future strategies (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008; Peters & Wagner, 2011). Barnett and Weiss's (2008) study on humanitarianism demonstrates that ethical and operational oversight of foreign policy activities enhances policy quality.

It is observed that parliament also reshapes the relationship between foreign policy and economic policy. Parliament's approval process can be determinative over commercial agreements, foreign economic relations, and investment decisions (Keohane, 1984). Claude's (1964) classic study on international organization problems emphasizes the importance of integrating economic and political decisions for international stability. Strong democratic oversight in foreign policy enables the country's definition of national interest to be determined with broader societal participation; this participation increases the legitimacy of foreign policy at national and international levels. Parliament's direct interaction with international institutions expands diplomatic networks in foreign policy and provides new information sources to the policy-making process; this interaction elevates institutional capacity (Zürn, 2018; Hurd, 2020). Cogan, Hurd, and Johnstone's (2016) handbook of international organizations comprehensively addresses the increasing role of parliaments in global governance structures.

The research demonstrates that parliamentary diplomacy assumes a complementary function to the executive's official diplomacy. Parliamentary delegations' international contacts create additional channels toward foreign policy objectives and strengthen soft power capacity (Nye, 2004). Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate's (2017) study on the United Nations and changing world politics systematically examines the increasing importance of parliamentary diplomacy in multilateral platforms. Parliament's inclusion in crisis diplomacy processes ensures that measures to be taken against international conflicts are more legitimate and more acceptable

by society; this situation increases foreign policy success. It has been found that in countries where parliamentary oversight is weak, foreign policy decisions exhibit a tendency toward personalization, while in countries where it is strong, they become institutionalized; institutionalization constitutes a critical variable in terms of predictability (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Neack's (2018) study on the new foreign policy in a globalizing age demonstrates that the personalization of foreign policy decisions weakens institutional consistency and increases unpredictability.

The findings reveal that parliaments play an important role in the preservation of ethical and legal standards in foreign policy. Particularly the prevention of international law violations and the protection of human rights stand out in this context (Donnelly, 2013; Risse et al., 1999). Wendt's (1999) social theory of international politics emphasizes that state identities and normative structures are shaped by domestic institutional processes, drawing attention to parliaments' role in this norm-creating process. The oversight function assumed by parliaments in foreign policy constitutes not merely a process constraining government's authorities but also a mechanism that renders foreign policy making more participatory and pluralistic; this situation ensures foreign policy's transition from closed elite processes to the democratic public sphere. Rosenau's (1997) study on governance along the domestic-foreign frontier emphasizes that foreign policy making has transformed into a multi-actor process in the age of globalization and the central role of parliaments in this process.

The research findings demonstrate that the traditional argument that parliamentary intervention in foreign policy constrains executive flexibility is not valid in all circumstances. On the contrary, examples where participatory processes provide governments with stronger democratic authority in international negotiations are increasingly growing (Moravcsik, 1998). Baylis, Smith, and Owens's (2019) comprehensive study on the globalization of world politics demonstrates the positive relationship between domestic political support and international negotiation success in numerous cases. In countries where parliamentary oversight is strong, it is observed that foreign policy scandals and unlawful practices are detected at early stages; this situation contributes both to the preservation of institutional integrity and to the long-term stability of foreign policy. The expansion of parliament's authority to demand information from the executive makes it difficult for foreign policy decisions to be implemented arbitrarily on the basis of secrecy and ensures that foreign policy becomes a more reliable domain both domestically and internationally. Goldstein and Pevehouse's (2023) international relations textbook demonstrates the direct relationship between transparency and credibility through numerous contemporary examples.

The data obtained in the study has revealed a positive relationship between compliance with the transparency norm in international relations and parliamentary oversight power; this relationship supports the institutional foundations of democratic foreign policy (Franck, 1990). Parliamentary authorities to demand information and question the executive in the foreign policy domain increase the accuracy of data used by foreign policy makers and reduce the probability of decision-making based on misinformation; this process directly contributes to policy quality. Hudson's (2014) study on foreign policy analysis systematically explains how decision-makers' cognitive processes affect policy quality and the corrective role of institutional oversight mechanisms in this process. The findings confirm that parliaments assume a central position within the accountability architecture of foreign policy; the strengthening of accountability mechanisms increases state credibility in the international arena. Reus-Smit's (1999) study on the moral purpose of the state emphasizes that institutional accountability constitutes a fundamental element of states' normative legitimacy.

Parliamentary debate of foreign policy decisions grants opposition parties the opportunity for constructive participation in the policy process, thereby supporting the development of a foreign policy consensus culture. Consensus culture is of vital importance for the continuity of foreign policy (Kaarbo, 2012). Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne's (2016) study on foreign policy theories, actors, and cases demonstrates through various examples that inter-party consensus constitutes the fundamental condition for providing continuity in foreign policy. Parliamentary utilization of expert cadres, advisors, and research units in foreign policy making facilitates decision-making processes being based on scientific foundations and ensures foreign policy becomes aligned with academic knowledge (Goodin, 2011). The capacity to produce foreign policy compatible with international organizations depends on the quality of the oversight process that parliament conducts through relevant committees; professional committees play an important role in the internalization of international standards. Breuning's (2007) comparative foreign policy analysis systematically reveals the impact of parliamentary committees' expertise level on foreign policy quality.

When considering the domestic policy consequences of foreign policy decisions as well, parliament's oversight function in this domain offers a stronger protective mechanism in terms of both societal and economic effects; the multidimensional impacts of political decisions are evaluated more soundly through this pathway. The processes of harmonizing international agreements ratified by parliament with national law determine the reflections of foreign policy in domestic law; these processes strengthen the fundamental role of legal oversight in foreign policy (Byers, 2000). Dunne et al.'s (2021) study on international relations theories comparatively examines how different theoretical approaches conceptualize the relationship between parliamentary oversight and foreign policy. The study demonstrates that parliaments are key actors enhancing foreign policy's crisis resolution capacity; parliamentary oversight of steps taken by the executive during crisis moments increases the legitimacy of international crisis diplomacy. Jentleson's (2020) study on the dynamics of American foreign policy reveals through case studies the critical importance of domestic political support in crisis management.

The existence of parliamentary oversight can reduce the impact of populist tendencies in foreign policy. While populist foreign policies generally rely on short-term political gains, parliamentary processes determine the legal and institutional limits of such orientations (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Holsti's (2006) study on the making of American foreign policy demonstrates how populist discourses weaken foreign policy consistency and how institutional oversight provides protection against such tendencies. The multi-actor structure of modern foreign policy has rendered the role of parliaments more important than ever; multilateral diplomacy cannot generate societal legitimacy without parliamentary oversight mechanisms. The increasing role of parliaments in international relations has led to the institutionalization of the concept of parliamentary diplomacy at the global level; this new diplomatic instrument balances traditional executive dominance in foreign policy. Ruggie's (1993) study on multilateralism emphasizes that the increasing role of parliamentary actors in multilateral diplomacy strengthens the democratic legitimacy of international cooperation.

Another important point emphasized in the discussion section of the study is that parliament's role in the foreign policy domain relates not only to the breadth of authorities but also to the capacity for exercising these authorities. When institutional capacity is lacking, constitutional authorities can remain dysfunctional (Beetham, 2006; Norton, 1998). Olson and Norton's (1996b) study on national parliaments and the European Union demonstrates that legal authorities remain ineffective when not supported by actual exercise capacity. The continuity of parliamentary oversight's positive effects on foreign policy is also closely related to the nature of competition among political parties; constructive competition elevates foreign

policy quality while destructive competition destabilizes policy. Parliaments, by including broader segments of society in foreign policy processes, enhance the democratic character of foreign policy; this situation elevates the social acceptance of foreign policy decisions. Risse's (2011) study on governance in areas of limited statehood systematically demonstrates how multi-stakeholder processes strengthen policy legitimacy.

Finally, the fundamental conclusion emerging throughout the discussion section is that the strengthening of parliaments' role in foreign policy constitutes a prerequisite not only for domestic political order but also for being a reliable actor in international relations (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997). In this context, effective parliamentary oversight constitutes the cornerstone of both domestic legal order and foreign policy performance. Parliament's systematic oversight of foreign policy from legal, fiscal, and political perspectives ensures that state foreign policy is accountable, sustainable, and compatible with international law; this three-dimensional oversight model constitutes the requirement of contemporary foreign policy (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Wagner, 2018). When considered together with Risse's (2011) studies on governance structures, it becomes evident that parliamentary oversight constitutes the cornerstone of democratic legitimacy not only at the national level but also in global governance systems.

7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research has revealed the determinative role of parliament's legal, institutional, and oversight capacity on foreign policy processes. The fundamental findings of the study have confirmed, in a manner consistent with the predictions of principal-agent theory (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Peters, Wagner, & Deitelhoff, 2010), the institutional design approach (Tsebelis, 2002; Goodin, 2011), and democratic governance models (Beetham, 2006; O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004), that parliamentary oversight systematically strengthens foreign policy legitimacy and effectiveness. The findings demonstrate that parliamentary oversight in democratic regimes is indispensable not only for domestic governance but also for elevating the legitimacy and effectiveness level of foreign policy decisions (Raunio & Wagner, 2018; Wagner, 2018). Results derived from panel data analysis have revealed a strong positive relationship between the parliamentary capacity index and foreign policy consistency; case studies have shown that the causal mechanisms behind this relationship operate through channels of information equalization, institutional restraint, and normative pressure (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Tsebelis, 2002; Beetham, 2006). Consistent with the veto players theory of the comparative politics literature, it has been supported with empirical evidence that the institutional restraining power possessed by parliaments structurally increases foreign policy stability (Lake & Powell, 1999). Consequently, the strengthening of accountability mechanisms in foreign policy making is becoming a strategic necessity that increases the state's credibility in the international arena (Slaughter, 2004; Ikenberry, 2001).

Although the relationship of parliament's legislative function with foreign policy often appears indirect, this study has revealed that processes that seem indirect actually shape foreign policy outcomes in a marked manner. Research findings have demonstrated that in countries where international agreements pass through the parliamentary approval process, agreement texts are examined more comprehensively, potential risks are detected early, and the compatibility of agreements with the domestic legal order is ensured (Franck, 1990; Slaughter, 2004; Byers, 2000). Parliament's role is directly determinative particularly in areas such as the transposition of international agreements into domestic law, the implementation of economic sanctions, the planning of defense investments, and the approval of foreign policy financing (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008; Rothstein, 2011). These

findings reveal that parliament's legislative authority is not merely a formal procedure in foreign policy; rather, it constitutes a structural mechanism that forms the legal foundation of foreign policy, transposes international obligations into domestic law, and thereby guarantees the state's adherence to international law norms (Krasner, 1999; Byers, 2000; Hurrell, 2007). The relational nature of sovereignty long advocated by international law theorists is concretized through parliamentary approval processes and functions as an institutional bridge between national sovereignty and international obligations (Franck, 1990; Krasner, 1999).

In terms of theoretical coherence, the most important contribution of this study is that it has confirmed with empirical data the multiple theoretical framework explaining parliamentary oversight's impact on foreign policy (Hudson, 2014; Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2016). When viewed from a normative framework, it has been observed that foreign policy decisions in developed democracies with a strong parliamentary oversight culture are more stable, more accountable, and more socially legitimized (Lijphart, 2012; Dahl, 1971). It has been supported by the findings that the information asymmetry problem predicted by principal-agent theory can be reduced through parliamentary information-obtaining mechanisms (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Peters, Wagner, & Deitelhoff, 2010); that the institutional restraint capacity indicated by veto players theory increases foreign policy consistency (Tsebelis, 2002; Lake & Powell, 1999); and that parliamentary oversight emphasized by democratic peace theory reduces conflict propensity (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997; Reiter & Stam, 2002). This multiple theoretical confirmation has revealed the necessity and productivity of an interdisciplinary approach in parliamentary oversight research (Dunne et al., 2021; Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2019). Furthermore, the study has demonstrated that the traditional realist paradigm's approach viewing foreign policy as the executive's exclusive domain (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) requires questioning on empirical grounds, and has supported the proposition of liberal institutionalism that domestic institutional structures determine foreign policy behavior (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Moravcsik, 1998; Keohane & Nye, 2001). In the long-standing realist-liberal theoretical tension within the discipline of international relations, this research provides strong support in favor of liberal institutionalism through empirical evidence (Dunne et al., 2021).

The most original contribution of the research to the literature is that it has systematically identified three fundamental mechanisms explaining parliamentary oversight's effectiveness on foreign policy: the information equalization mechanism, the institutional restraint mechanism, and the normative pressure mechanism (Born & Fluri, 2003; Griglio, 2020). The information equalization mechanism has shown that parliament reduces the information advantage possessed by the executive through question motions, investigative committees, and expert consultation processes (Longley & Davidson, 1998; Müller & Saalfeld, 1997); the institutional restraint mechanism has shown that parliament's authorities of vote of no confidence, budget rejection, and agreement non-ratification compel the executive to act more carefully (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008; Wagner, 2018); and the normative pressure mechanism has shown that parliament directs the executive toward norm-compliant behavior by emphasizing international law and human rights norms (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Donnelly, 2013). This tripartite mechanism model provides a conceptual framework for measuring parliamentary oversight's foreign policy impact in future research (Hudson, 2014; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). Particularly detailed analysis of how these mechanisms operate under which conditions in case studies conducted through process tracing methodology will provide important contributions to the parliamentary oversight literature (George, 1980; Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

The first important recommendation at the policy level is the institutional strengthening of parliaments' foreign policy oversight capacity (Beetham, 2006; Griglio, 2020; Stapenhurst,

Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008). This strengthening should be realized along four fundamental axes: First, the specialization level of parliaments' foreign relations committees should be elevated, and regular international relations, international law, and comparative foreign policy training should be provided to committee members (Longley & Davidson, 1998; Müller & Saalfeld, 1997). Second, independent research centers attached to parliaments should be established; these centers should be able to independently analyze the executive's foreign policy documents and offer alternative policy proposals to parliamentarians (Norton, 1990, 1998). Third, parliaments' rights to obtain information should be expanded; particularly in international negotiation processes, the executive should be obligated to inform parliament regularly and in a timely manner (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Peters, Wagner, & Deitelhoff, 2010). Fourth, digital data management and archiving systems should be developed; modern technological infrastructure that parliaments will use to monitor, evaluate, and compare foreign policy decisions should be established. Reforms along these four axes will elevate parliaments' actual oversight capacity to the level required by their constitutional authorities (Goodin, 2011). The critical importance of institutional capacity building for democratic consolidation is clearly visible particularly in the experiences of newly democratizing countries (Olson & Norton, 1996a; Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999).

The second policy recommendation is the institutional guarantee of parliaments' early participation in foreign policy processes (Kaarbo, 2012; Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Findings have demonstrated that in cases where parliament is included in the preparatory stage of foreign policy decisions, both the technical quality of decisions has risen and the level of societal acceptance has increased (Peters & Wagner, 2011; Wagner, 2018). In this context, executive organs should be obligated to inform parliament and obtain its opinion when preparing strategic foreign policy documents, before entering into large-scale international agreements, and when making military intervention decisions (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008; Inter-Parliamentary Union & Venice Commission, 2008). The early participation model increases the legitimacy of decisions while simultaneously reducing the domestic political resistance that may be encountered during the implementation stage (Lindsay, 1994). Particularly parliament's participation in the process as a constituent actor in the preparation of long-term strategic foreign policy documents strengthens institutional memory in foreign policy and ensures policy continuity during government changes. Comparative analyses demonstrate that foreign policy consistency is higher in countries where parliaments possess *ex ante* oversight authority (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008).

The third important recommendation is the enhancement of foreign policy transparency and the strengthening of public participation (Dahl, 1971; Beetham, 2006). Making parliament's foreign policy sessions open to the public, publishing regular reports on foreign policy issues, and making parliamentary diplomacy activities visible will contribute to the elevation of foreign policy consciousness at the societal level. Research findings have demonstrated that foreign policy decisions receiving public support have higher implementation capacity and are more resilient against international crises (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997). Accordingly, it is recommended that parliaments establish regular consultation platforms with civil society organizations, universities, and expert bodies; that foreign policy committees organize hearing sessions and broadcast these processes live through digital platforms. These transparency mechanisms will not only increase democratic participation but will also create a multi-stakeholder negotiation environment that elevates the quality of foreign policy decisions (Beetham, 2006; Griglio, 2020). It has long been known in the decision-making

psychology literature that multi-actor deliberation processes reduce cognitive errors and enable more rational decisions to be made (Jervis, 1976; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010).

The fourth policy recommendation is the activation of parliaments' fiscal oversight capacity in the foreign policy domain (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008; Rothstein, 2011). Findings have demonstrated that budget oversight has an indirect but powerful effect on the determination of foreign policy priorities (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008). In this context, supreme audit institutions should regularly examine foreign policy expenditures, defense procurements should be transparently reported, diplomatic mission expenditures should be subjected to effectiveness analysis, and foreign aid programs should be evaluated in a results-oriented manner. The strengthening of fiscal oversight will not only ensure the effective use of resources but will also guarantee that foreign policy strategies are grounded on realistic fiscal foundations and their sustainability. Coordinated work between parliaments' budget committees and foreign relations committees will enable holistic evaluation of the fiscal and strategic dimensions of foreign policy (Griglio, 2020). The application of the performance-based budgeting approach emphasized in the public financial management literature to the foreign policy domain will contribute to making foreign policy effectiveness measurable (Rothstein, 2011).

The fifth recommendation is the recognition and strengthening of parliamentary diplomacy as an institutional foreign policy instrument (Raunio & Wagner, 2018). Research findings have demonstrated that inter-parliamentary relations, regional parliamentary platforms, and parliamentarians' international visits increase the country's diplomatic visibility and contribute to the formation of multi-channel diplomacy networks. Parliamentary diplomacy is a strategic instrument that complements government diplomacy and opens alternative dialogue channels during crises (Kissinger, 1994; Jentleson, 2020). In this context, effective use of parliaments' memberships in international parliamentary unions (Inter-Parliamentary Union), regular functioning of bilateral parliamentary friendship groups, and parliamentarians' active representation of country positions in international platforms should be encouraged. The execution of parliamentary diplomacy activities in coordination with the executive will make it possible to benefit from the advantages of a multi-actor structure while maintaining consistency in foreign policy. From a multi-level governance perspective, parliamentary diplomacy contributes to the democratization of global governance by functioning as a bridge between national and international levels (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Zürn, 2018).

The sixth policy recommendation is the harmonization of parliaments' legal oversight function with international law norms (Franck, 1990; Byers, 2000; Hurrell, 2007). Findings have demonstrated that foreign policy compliance with international human rights norms, humanitarian law rules, and environmental agreements is higher in countries where parliamentary oversight is strong (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Donnelly, 2013; Beitz, 2009). In this context, it is recommended that parliaments conduct human rights impact analyses in international agreement ratification processes, establish environmental and sustainability criteria, and take into account the perspective of gender equality. The establishment of regular reporting mechanisms by parliaments to monitor compliance with international norms will create an institutional pressure that will encourage the executive to behave in accordance with these norms. This recommendation will ensure that foreign policy is grounded not merely on an interest-based but also on a value-based foundation and will strengthen the country's normative reputation in the international arena (Ruggie, 1993, 1998; Reus-Smit, 1999; Zürn, 2018). The mediating role played by parliaments in norm internalization processes emphasized by constructivist international relations theory is of

critical importance in the establishment of international norms at the national level (Wendt, 1999; Reus-Smit, 1999).

The seventh recommendation is the development of parliaments' crisis management capacity (Wagner, 2018; Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008). The research has demonstrated that parliament's regular informing of the executive during international crises increases institutional trust and strengthens coordination in crisis management (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). However, findings have also revealed that parliaments cannot access sufficient information during crisis moments and are excluded from decision processes. For this reason, parliaments must establish special procedures that can function during crisis periods, emergency meeting mechanisms must be established, and the executive's obligation to share crisis information with parliament must be clarified. The maintenance of parliamentary oversight in crisis management will ensure the functioning of democratic oversight even during extraordinary periods and the prevention of arbitrary exercise of executive authorities (Born & Hänggi, 2004; O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004; Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999). The establishment of the delicate balance between strengthening state capacity during crisis periods and preserving democratic oversight is of vital importance for the resilience of democratic regimes (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama, 2011).

The eighth recommendation is the institutionalization of information flow in the parliament-executive relationship (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Peters, Wagner, & Deitelhoff, 2010). The research has demonstrated that information asymmetry constitutes the most critical obstacle before parliamentary oversight (Hermann, Kegley, & Rosenau, 1987). In order to break the executive's information monopoly regarding diplomatic processes, parliaments' right to receive regular and mandatory briefings should be guaranteed at the constitutional level. Foreign affairs ministries should submit foreign policy activity reports to parliament in six-month periods; they should share with parliamentarians evaluations regarding strategic partnerships, alliance relations, and conflict zones. The regulation of information sharing through institutional mechanisms will prevent the arbitrary rejection of parliaments' requests for briefings and will structurally increase the effectiveness of foreign policy oversight (Griglio, 2020). The reduction of information asymmetry is the fundamental condition for preventing the moral hazard and adverse selection problems predicted by principal-agent theory (Born & Hänggi, 2004).

The ninth recommendation is the development of international support programs for parliamentary capacity building in developing democracies (Beetham, 2006; Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008). Research findings have demonstrated that parliamentary oversight is strong in established democracies, but parliaments in newly democratizing and hybrid regimes experience institutional capacity insufficiency (Olson & Norton, 1996a; Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999). International parliamentary unions, regional organizations, and democracy support institutions should provide technical support to developing country parliaments; should provide foreign policy oversight training to parliamentarians; and should transfer resources for the establishment of institutional infrastructure. These international solidarity and capacity building programs will contribute to the strengthening of parliamentary oversight at the global level and the consolidation of democracy (Beetham, 2006; Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008; Donahue & Nye, 2000). The timing and sequencing of institutional capacity building in democratic transition processes is of critical importance; the strengthening of parliamentary institutions constitutes one of the cornerstones of democratic consolidation (Olson & Norton, 1996a; Lijphart, 2012).

The tenth recommendation is the effective use of digital technologies in parliamentary oversight (Held & McGrew, 1999). The use of data analytics, artificial intelligence-supported monitoring systems, and digital diplomacy tools in parliaments can increase the accuracy and speed of foreign policy analyses. The development of parliaments' digital archiving and data management systems will strengthen institutional memory and will make comparative foreign policy evaluations possible. Furthermore, the provision of citizen participation in foreign policy discussions through digital platforms will facilitate the extension of the participatory democracy model to the foreign policy domain (Dahl, 1971). Digitalization has the potential to render parliamentary oversight both more effective and more inclusive. However, the risks of digital disinformation and manipulation should be taken into account; parliaments' digital literacy capacity should be strengthened.

The first recommendation regarding future research orientations is the conduct of studies testing the causal effect of parliamentary oversight on foreign policy outcomes through experimental and quasi-experimental designs (Lake & Powell, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998). Although this research has revealed important findings using mixed methods, the impact of parliamentary reforms on foreign policy behavior can be measured more precisely through the use of natural experiments, interrupted time series analyses, and regression discontinuity designs to strengthen causal inferences. Particularly situations where parliamentary authorities have expanded or contracted as a result of constitutional changes offer ideal natural experiment opportunities to test causal mechanisms (George, 1980; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The ability to capture real-world variability without compromising methodological rigor constitutes the fundamental methodological challenge before parliamentary oversight research.

The second research recommendation is the comparative examination of parliamentary oversight's impact in different foreign policy domains (Hudson, 2014; Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2016). This study has addressed foreign policy holistically; however, future research can investigate the differentiated effects of parliamentary oversight in specific domains such as security policy (Wagner, 2018; Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008), trade policy (Keohane, 1984), development aid, climate diplomacy, and human rights policy (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Donnelly, 2013). The technical characteristics, urgency level, and public sensitivity of each policy domain affect the functioning of parliamentary oversight in different ways; systematic understanding of these differences will provide important contributions to the literature. Domain-specific comparisons will assist in understanding under which conditions parliamentary oversight is more effective (Neack, 2018).

The third research recommendation is the examination of mediating and moderating variables in the relationship between parliamentary oversight and foreign policy outcomes (Kaarbo, 2012; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). How factors such as the fragmentation level of the political party system, the structure of coalition governments (Kaarbo, 2012), the degree of media independence, the strength of civil society, and the professionalism level of bureaucracy (Rothstein, 2011; Fukuyama, 2011) shape the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight should be addressed in depth in future research. The effect of these contextual factors can be empirically tested using multilevel analysis models (Lijphart, 2012). In the absence of systematic analysis of contextual factors, generalizations regarding the effect of parliamentary oversight may be misleading.

The fourth research orientation is the examination of how parliamentary oversight operates at the international organizations level (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Zürn, 2018; Cogan, Hurd, & Johnstone, 2016). The impact of regional parliamentary structures such as the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament, and the Latin American Parliament on

regional foreign policy has not yet been sufficiently researched. How the interaction of national and supranational parliaments determines foreign policy outcomes from a multi-level governance perspective should be the focus of future research (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Rittberger, Zangl, & Kruck, 2019). This research is of critical importance for understanding the role of parliamentary oversight in global governance (Zürn, 2018; Ruggie, 1993, 1998). The role played by parliamentary structures in closing the democratic legitimacy deficit of international organizations constitutes one of the fundamental problematiques of the global governance literature (Hurd, 2020; Weiss, Forsythe, & Coate, 2017).

In general, this study has revealed in the light of scientific data that parliament's legislative and oversight functions have a determinative impact on foreign policy (Born & Hänggi, 2004; Tsebelis, 2002; Raunio & Wagner, 2018). The strengthening of parliamentary oversight is indispensable for the democratization, institutionalization, and legitimization of foreign policy (Beetham, 2006; Dahl, 1971; O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). The three fundamental conclusions of the research are as follows: First, parliamentary oversight is a matter of institutional design and capacity; constitutional authorities alone are not sufficient, the institutional infrastructure that makes the exercise of these authorities possible must also be established (Goodin, 2011; Norton, 1998). Second, parliamentary oversight is a multi-channel process; impact is maximized when legislative, budgetary, information-obtaining, political responsibility, and parliamentary diplomacy mechanisms operate together (Born & Fluri, 2003; Griglio, 2020; Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & von Trapp, 2008). Third, parliamentary oversight determines not only national democracy quality but also the state's credibility and predictability in international relations (Slaughter, 2004; Ikenberry, 2001; Keohane, 1989). These three fundamental conclusions necessitate the reconceptualization of parliaments' role in foreign policy and the structuring of institutional reforms on this basis.

In conclusion, the enhancement of parliamentary capacity, the strengthening of transparency mechanisms, and the improvement of inter-institutional checks-and-balances relationships constitute fundamental conditions for the sustainability of foreign policy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Lijphart, 2012; Tsebelis, 2002). The theoretical framework, empirical findings, and policy recommendations presented by this study constitute concrete foundations for both academic debates and institutional reforms (Hudson, 2014; Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2016). The future of democratic governance depends on the activation of parliamentary oversight in all decision-making processes, including the foreign policy domain (Beetham, 2006; Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Zürn, 2018). The ultimate objective of this research is to contribute to the stronger representation of societal will in foreign policy processes by removing foreign policy from the monopoly of narrow elite groups (Dahl, 1971; Russett, 1993). Only thus can both democratic legitimacy and foreign policy effectiveness be strengthened simultaneously (Keohane, 1989; Doyle, 1997; Wagner, 2018). In the face of the complex global challenges of the twenty-first century, the strengthening of democratic institutions is not merely a normative ideal but also a practical necessity for effective global governance (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2019; Jackson & Sørensen, 2022).

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